On Thursday, February 27, 2014 9:38:05 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 24 Feb 2014, at 17:31, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:13:26 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: >> >> On 24 February 2014 02:43, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> How do you turn your desire to move your hand into the neurological >>> changes which move them? The neurological change is the expression of what >>> you actually are. These primitive levels of sense are beyond the question >>> of 'how', they are more in the neighborhood of 'how else?' >> >> >> But we cannot be content to let "how else?" stand as mere rhetoric, can >> we? >> > > Yes, in this case, we absolutely can. Otherwise you enter into a regress > of having to ask 'how does asking how' work? > > > If you follow the unavoidably more mathematical thread (which exploits the > link between computationalism and theoretical computer science) you might > eventually understand how a machine can explain its entire 3p functioning > (and with chance: at its correct 1p substitution level). >
The only mathematical thread I would be interested in following is one which exploits the link between computationalism or theoretical computer science and aesthetic realism. > > Like a tiny part of arithmetical truth can already explain why normal > universal numbers get in awe in front of the gap between proof and truth. > Why would the gap between proof and truth cause awe? What arithmetic function does awe server? > > > > > We don't have to ask how it works, nor must there be an answer which could > satisfy such an expectation. > > > But we *can* ask, isn't it? We might never find the correct answer, but we > can find better and better theories. > We can ask, sure, but its a mistake. We can ask who matter is made of also, or where arithmetic is, but they don't lead to better theories, they lead to confusion. > > Advantage of comp? We can easily do science. > Sure, it makes sense that theories that are made from science instead of reality would be easier to manage with science. > > > The whole idea of 'how' is a cognitive framing of sensible comparisons. > Sure, it seems very important to the intellect, just as air seems very > important to the lungs, but that doesn't mean that 'how' can refer to > anything primordial. > > > Comp is a banal theory, in the sense of being believed (consciously or > not) by many people, mainly materialist . Few computationalists today are > aware that it put theology and physics upside down, yet in a simple > elementary interpretations capable to be understood by any universal > machine. > I have no problem with that. I'm never talking about materialist physics, only the physics of computation and how it supervenes on deeper, non-arithmetic participation. > > > > > It's like asking an actor in a movie asking how they got into a projection > on a screen. > > > Bad analogy, misused. You beg the question. You just can't compare > authentic self-referentially correct machines, amenable to mathematical > studies, with dolls. > I compare them with dolls only as opposed to zombies. Dolls are 3D machines which perform a very limited range of behaviors. Dolls that can cry or walk add some 4D behavioral capabilities, but they are still 3D dolls doing 4D playback of a 4D recording. Talking about self-referentially correct machines is an order of magnitude more sophisticated, obviously. These are 4D dolls doing 5D meta-playbacks of 4D recordings. They not only play back their program on cue, they have a program to store and evaluate cues in a progressive way. Despite appearances to the contrary, I am not dismissing the significance of this, nor am I failing to take into account that your view of machines includes even more persuasive evidence...perhaps the UM or Lobian machine qualifies as a 5D or 6D masterpiece, and I don't deny that. What I deny is that it makes any fundamental difference to the impersonal, rootless vantage point of any possible program. Consciousness is not entirely dimensional, it creates dimensionality. What computational theory produces is not mind, but rather mentalism - cardboard cut outs of beliefs and intensional references through which a kind of cychic cold-reading can be deduced, but there is no feeling, no aesthetic content necessary for this to occur. > Study the movie graph argument, and you will see that you are almost > correct here, but this only by reifying mind and/or matter in a way where > in comp it becomes a problem in math. > I've looked at the MGA before. I don't see that it addresses any of the issues that I keep bringing up. Craig > > Bruno > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
