On 23 February 2014 09:22, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: > On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote: >> >> On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote: >>> >>> No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of >>> consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the >>> continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is >>> what is observed). Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the >>> circle of observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a >>> transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac). >>> This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics >>> of some particular continuation. >>> >>> >>> So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past? >>> >>> This would imply there is no initial state of mind - assumed digital, >> I assume? - or that every possible mental state has a precursor. Does >> computational theory assume this, or can a mind start from a blank state? >> >> >> Even if it doesn't, it would seem a remarkable coincidence that everyone >> seems to be on their first consciousness. >> > > Not necessarily. It might be a selection effect (a similar argument can be > made for the QTI, if true - why are we at the start of an infinite > lifetime? Well, you have to start somewhere.) >
Right. And I guess you'd expect me by now to invite you to consider this with a Hoylean hat on. From Hoyle's perspective a momentary experience can be *typical* only to the degree that equivalent fungible experiences predominate in some underlying measure contest. So, as an analogy, experiences in which "I" hold a losing ticket in the UK lottery predominate hugely over those in which I hold a winning ticket, and this continues to be the case even though from Hoyle's perspective "I" am *all* the ticket holders. If this makes any sense, we must assume (for the analogy to hold) that experiences in which "I" appear to have a relatively recent origin in space and time predominate in the measure battle with those in which my apparent origin recedes towards some asymptotic limit. The former, one might say, are more *typical* of the experience of the universal observer than the latter. David > > > Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness, > > I see no reason to assume that. >> > > Hence the phraseology used above. If you say "given that X", that means > you're assuming it for the sake of argument. Sorry, maybe I should have > said "if we assume that..." to make it clearer. > > does this just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that "I > am he as you are he as he is me", etc). > > Or does it imply that consciousness and memory are intrinsic to certain >> physical processes? >> >> Since you can "see no reason to assume" the initial premise (see above) > it seems a bit odd that you are then trying to draw conclusions from it! > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
