On 2/23/2014 2:45 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 23 February 2014 19:38, meekerdb <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

    On 2/23/2014 4:35 AM, David Nyman wrote:
    Not "my" consciousness, no. I'm just suggesting that CTM ultimately relies 
on some
    transcendent notion of perspective itself. IOW, the sensible world is 
conceived as
    the resultant of the inter-subjective agreement of its possible observers, 
each of
    which discovers itself to be centred in some perspective.

    Is the sensible world of *possible* observers supposed to include the whole 
world.


Well, in a way I was merely stating a tautology: i.e. the "world" of inter-subjective agreement is just what we infer from those observations. I didn't mean to imply that such a world stands alone or is in need of no further explanation, quite the contrary. But a stable perspective on a sensible world, in something like this sense, is what comp, for example, assumes to be invariant to substitution at the relevant level.


The point I was getting at was whether you're supposing there are *insensible^ parts to the world, which we may infer from the sensible part or from mathematics?

Brent


David

      I'm always suspicious of the word "possible".  Does it refer to chance, 
i.e. many
    events were possible, I might have had coffee instead of tea this morning, 
but only
    a few are actual?  Does it refer to anything not prohibited by (our best 
theory of)
    physics: It's possible a meteorite might strike my house?  Or is it 
anything not
    entailing a contradiction: X and not X?


    Brent
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