On 23 February 2014 14:55, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote:
> This might be a more concise way of making my argument: > > It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the > method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are > encountered. > > My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as > experience with technological devices, is that "everything which is counted > must first be encountered". Extending this dictum, I propose that > > 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and > 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic > re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. > 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be > pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. > > My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how > numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the > whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual > machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware substrate, > but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself > from data which is not relevant to the machine? > > Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism behind > computation, I conclude that: > > 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical theory > of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity. > 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical inquiry > to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function. > 6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii fallacy, > as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro level mental > phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental phenomena > which is overlooked entirely within CTM. > 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and > should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the fallacy > directly. > 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a trans-theoretical > explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters is the sole axiom. > 9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science can be > redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to reversing the > foundations of number theory so that they are sense-subordinate. > 10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation, rather > than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds from PIP as a > perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an impersonal, > theoretical platform of sense. > I'm beginning to get the impression in points 9 and 10 that you are wavering a little in your blanket rejection of CTM. My contention is that CTM already "rehabilitates" and "redeems" its mathematical science in the sense you suggest as a consequence of its explicit reliance on the invariance of consciousness to some assumed level of functional substitutability. This already entails that CTM - as must be true of any theory that doesn't effectively junk the whole notion as supernumerary - incorporates consciousness into its schema as a transcendentally original assumption *at the outset*. Hence it eludes the jaws of petito principii by seeking not to *explain* but to *exploit* this assumption, at the appropriately justified level of explanation. David > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
