On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:17:02 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: > > On 24 February 2014 03:38, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]<javascript:> > > wrote: > >> >> >> On Sunday, February 23, 2014 7:22:36 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: >> >>> On 23 February 2014 19:55, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sunday, February 23, 2014 10:35:33 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 23 February 2014 14:55, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> This might be a more concise way of making my argument: >>>>>> >>>>>> It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the >>>>>> method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are >>>>>> encountered. >>>>>> >>>>>> My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as >>>>>> experience with technological devices, is that "everything which is >>>>>> counted >>>>>> must first be encountered". Extending this dictum, I propose that >>>>>> >>>>>> 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, >>>>>> and >>>>>> 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic >>>>>> re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. >>>>>> 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be >>>>>> pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. >>>>>> >>>>>> My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how >>>>>> numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the >>>>>> whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual >>>>>> machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware >>>>>> substrate, >>>>>> but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate >>>>>> itself >>>>>> from data which is not relevant to the machine? >>>>>> >>>>>> Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism >>>>>> behind computation, I conclude that: >>>>>> >>>>>> 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical >>>>>> theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity. >>>>>> 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical >>>>>> inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function. >>>>>> 6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii >>>>>> fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro level >>>>>> mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental >>>>>> phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM. >>>>>> 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and >>>>>> should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the fallacy >>>>>> directly. >>>>>> 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a >>>>>> trans-theoretical explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters >>>>>> is >>>>>> the sole axiom. >>>>>> 9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science can >>>>>> be redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to reversing >>>>>> the >>>>>> foundations of number theory so that they are sense-subordinate. >>>>>> 10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation, >>>>>> rather than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds from >>>>>> PIP >>>>>> as a perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an impersonal, >>>>>> theoretical platform of sense. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I'm beginning to get the impression in points 9 and 10 that you are >>>>> wavering a little in your blanket rejection of CTM. >>>>> >>>> >>>> No, I've always held that the contents of CTM are still redeemable if >>>> we turn them inside out. >>>> >>>> >>>>> My contention is that CTM already "rehabilitates" and "redeems" its >>>>> mathematical science in the sense you suggest as a consequence of its >>>>> explicit reliance on the invariance of consciousness to some assumed >>>>> level >>>>> of functional substitutability. >>>>> >>>> >>>> That's not the sense that I suggest. I'm claiming that CTM can only be >>>> rehabilitated by recognizing that function can never be a substitute for >>>> consciousness, and that in fact all functions supervene on more primitive >>>> levels of sensitivity. >>>> >>>> >>>>> This already entails that CTM - as must be true of any theory that >>>>> doesn't effectively junk the whole notion as supernumerary - incorporates >>>>> consciousness into its schema as a transcendentally original assumption >>>>> *at >>>>> the outset*. Hence it eludes the jaws of petito principii by seeking not >>>>> to >>>>> *explain* but to *exploit* this assumption, at the appropriately >>>>> justified >>>>> level of explanation. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Then it is not a theory of mind, it is a theory of mental elaboration - >>>> which I am not opposed to, as long as mental elaboration is not conflated >>>> with additional capacities of sensation. We can, for instance, look >>>> through >>>> a camera which will transduce infra-red radiation to a visible color >>>> (usually phosphor green or black-body-like spectrum). CTM could be used, >>>> IMO, to develop this kind of transduced extension of sense, but it cannot >>>> be used to provide additional visual sense (like being able to actually >>>> see >>>> infra-red as a color). Regardless of how intelligent the behavior of the >>>> program seems, the actual depth of consciousness will never increase >>>> beyond >>>> the specifications of the technology used to implement it. >>>> >>> >>> Since you yourself brought the example of Galileo to mind, I think it >>> fair to point out that your examples above are faintly reminiscent of the >>> position of the Catholic hierarchy that as a natural philosopher he was of >>> course free to speculate on heliocentrism as a merely hypothetical >>> phenomenon but not a physically real one. >>> >> >> There's a lot of interesting echoes of this moment in history and in the >> Enlightenment Era. In simple terms, I would say that it is as if we are >> coming out the other side. Galileo was on the cutting edge of the wave >> toward the ontic and the personal. This time the cutting edge is toward >> transcending the ontic and reclaiming the personal. >> >> >>> IOW they were willing to concede that it could be useful instrumentally >>> in making predictions etc. but that it would never be acceptable as a >>> substitute for canonical (in this case, literally) "reality". >>> >> >> In an ultimate sense they were not wrong, it's just taken us a few >> centuries to discover why. >> >> >>> >>> But what if that mental elaboration were developed into such an >>> effective instrumental and explanatory tool that its account of the >>> relation between brain and mind, or between observer and observed, became >>> indispensable to our understanding of ourselves? Suppose, for example, that >>> a prosthesis for perceiving infra-red directly as a colour were capable of >>> being interfaced with our visual cortex on the general principles of the >>> wiki link I recently posted. Suppose, even, that non-human entities >>> elaborated along the lines you suggest above eventually became capable of >>> informing us directly what it was like to be them. What then? >>> >> >> The only evidence that would be compelling to me is to have someone get >> walked off of their own brain onto a digital brain, live for a few weeks, >> and then return to give a report. I honestly don't expect it to ever get >> that far. The great leap forward on this frontier seems to be a receding >> horizon. That YouTube was from 1990. >> > > I wasn't referring to the YouTube - that was just a fun way of > illustrating aspects of the puzzle. >
Right, but my point is that nothing has changed since then. There is no progress on the fundamental issue. > This is the link I meant: > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hippocampal_prosthesis > > It seems quite plausible on the basis of the kind of research reported in > this piece that more sophisticated prostheses exploiting the same general > principles could be used to restore at least components of damaged senses, > or even provide access to novel ones, without recourse to anything other > than functional or computational theory or practice. Let us suppose that > this is the case. How would one then be able to make a principled > distinction between a mere mental elaboration and the real thing? > Sure, but there is a difference between restoring damaged parts of a living person's brain and putting parts synthetic brain parts and expecting it to become a living person. Craig > > David > > > Now, 24 years later, there has been no improvement in our understanding, >> no progress whatsoever in these fundamental issues of consciousness. I >> think that I may actually have stumbled on the real improvement, but it's >> going to take a long time before people realize that computation is not the >> center of the universe. >> >> Craig >> >> >>> >>> David >>> >>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>>> >>>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>> >>> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> >> . >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
