On 24 February 2014 13:56, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote:
Sure, but there is a difference between restoring damaged parts of a living > person's brain and putting parts synthetic brain parts and expecting it to > become a living person. I think we need to examine that assumption of difference more closely. ISTM that, if you can replace or restore any part of a living person's brain, that is in any significant way involved in consciousness, with a functional equivalent, this must directly contradict any contention that function cannot emulate consciousness. How could one escape that conclusion? David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
