On 24 February 2014 13:56, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
Sure, but there is a difference between restoring damaged parts of a living > person's brain and putting parts synthetic brain parts and expecting it to > become a living person. I think we need to examine that assumption of difference more closely. ISTM that, if you can replace or restore any part of a living person's brain, that is in any significant way involved in consciousness, with a functional equivalent, this must directly contradict any contention that function cannot emulate consciousness. How could one escape that conclusion? David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
