Hi Quentin >> then I can't see how you could still agree with many world interpretation >> and reject probability, that's not consistent... unless of course, you >> reject MWI.
I definitely wouldn't say I accept MWI. But even so, not everyone who does accept it agrees that there is subjective uncertainty. So, I can accept MWI and reject the probability sums Bruno derives and be in good company. See here: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136 All the best Chris. From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 01:04:53 +0000 Hi Liz >> Let's also suppose you don't know which solar system you will be sent to, >> and that in fact the matter transmitter is supposed to send you to A or B >> with equal probability based on some "quantum coin flip". But by accident it >> duplicates you, and sends you to both. This effectively conflates the comp >> and MWI versions IMHO, so you can't easily disentangle them in this thought >> experiment. An important aspect of step 3's experiment is that it depicts a determined result from 3p which is, allegedly, subject to uncertainty from 1p. Thats the big result right? That seems to get lost in your revision. You get 1p uncertainty but at the expense of 3p certainty. By introducing a 'quantum coin flip' you're loading the dice towards uncertainty. So I can't really say you shown an equivalence between step 3 and MWI. >>This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures in the >>MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of me in each >>branch will be different, and it always seems to me, retrospectively, as >>though I only experienced one outcome. Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is any disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the person duplicated will experience and then what probability he should assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity criterion gets imposed. Its a consideration I've gone into at length and won't bore you with again. But I will say that where you think that what Bruno wants is just recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome, I think that he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability assignments would be asymmetric from the stand point of the person duplicated. Certainly for me he doesn't manage that. All the best Chris. > From: marc...@ulb.ac.be > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) > Date: Sun, 23 Feb 2014 07:56:14 +0100 > > > On 22 Feb 2014, at 21:09, LizR wrote to Clark (with the "above pap" = > the FPI of step 3): > > > The "above pap" is only a small step in an argument (and it only > > reproduces a result obtained in the MWI, anyway). > > > OK, but the MWI is a "big" thing, relying on another big thing: QM. > > The FPI assumes only the comp theory of mind, and extracts, as PGC > indicates, a strong form of indeterminacy in a purely deterministic > framework. That makes QM confirming a simple, (even according to > Clark) but startling and counter-intuitive consequence of > computationalism. > > That was new, and broke the common brain-mind identity thesis, and is > basically still ignored by everyone, except on this list and my > papers, 'course. > > Bruno > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
