On 25 February 2014 13:05, chris peck <chris_peck...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> Since Everett there have been numerous attempts to smuggle an account of > probability back into the theory, and more recent attempts: Deutsch, > Wallace, Greaves etc., do that by abandoning the concept of subjective > uncertainty altogether and replacing it with some kind of rational action > principle. In otherwords, you can expect to see spin up and spin down, but > you should act as if there was some objective bias towards one or the > other. The approach comes complete with its own set of philosophical > problems. > I can't see why the MWI's existing explanation of probability needs to have anything added. Probability in the MWI is deduced from the results of measurements by an experimenter. Effectively, if they assume that they inhabit a non-branching universe, they will regard the proportion of times a measurement comes out one way (spin up say) as the probability of that result occurring. If they assume an MWI perspective, however, the probabilty of that outcome is a measure of the proportion of experimenters who will be found in the spin-up branch. Is there something wrong with that? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
