On 26 February 2014 12:58, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:

>
> "The alien hand syndrome, as originally defined, was used to describe
>> cases involving anterior corpus callosal lesions producing involuntary
>> movement and a concomitant inability to distinguish the affected hand from
>> an examiner's hand when these were placed in the patient's unaffected hand.
>> In recent years, acceptable usage of the term has broadened considerably,
>> and has been defined as involuntary movement occurring in the context of
>> feelings of estrangement from or personification of the affected limb or
>> its movements. Three varieties of alien hand syndrome have been reported,
>> involving lesions of the corpus callosum alone, the corpus callosum plus
>> dominant medial frontal cortex, and posterior cortical/subcortical areas. A
>> patient with posterior alien hand syndrome of vascular aetiology is
>> reported and the findings are discussed in the light of a conceptualisation
>> of posterior alien hand syndrome as a disorder which may be less associated
>> with specific focal neuropathology than are its callosal and
>> callosal-frontal counterparts." -
>> http://jnnp.bmj.com/content/68/1/83.full
>
>
> This kind of alienation from the function of a limb would seem to
> contradict functionalism.
>

? AFAICS it wouldn't even *seem* to contradict functionalism.


> If functionalism identifies consciousness with function, then it would
> seem problematic that a functioning limb could be seen as estranged from
> the personal awareness, is it is really no different from a zombie in which
> the substitution level is set at the body level. There is no damage to the
> arm, no difference between one arm and another, and yet, its is felt to be
> outside of one's control and its sensations are felt not to be your
> sensations.
>

I think it is generally understood that the relevant disruption to function
is that of brain tissue, not that of the limb; hence the references in the
passage to lesions in the corpus callosum and other areas of the *brain*.
If the function of brain tissue is disrupted, then it would be consistent
to expect some concomitant disruption of consciousness, per functionalism.


> This would be precisely the kind of estrangement that I would expect to
> encounter during a gradual replacement of the brain with any inorganic
> substitute.
>

It's clear that's what you would expect, but to infer this much, purely on
the basis of the passage you quoted, is grasping at straws. Actually it's
not even that - it's a completely unsupported inference.


> At the level at which food becomes non-food, so too would the brain become
> non-brain, and any animation of the nervous system would fail to be
> incorporated into personal awareness. The living brain could still learn to
> use the prosthetic, and ultimately imbue it with its own articulation and
> familiarity to a surprising extent, but it is a one way street and the
> prosthetic has no capacity to find the personal awareness and merge with it.
>

I don't see how starting from an unsupported inference helps your case. In
fact, if you are proposing this as an example of the strength of your
position in general, it can only serve to weaken it.

David


>
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