On Saturday, March 1, 2014 1:52:12 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 28 Feb 2014, at 03:22, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Thursday, February 27, 2014 8:03:15 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: >> >> On 28 February 2014 03:02, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> >>> In other words, why, in a functionalist/materialist world would we need >>> a breakable program to keep telling us that our hand is not Alien? >>> >>> Or contrariwise, why do you need a breakable programme to tell you that >> it's your hand? >> > > Sure, that too. It doesn't make sense functionally. What difference does > it make 'who' the hand 'belongs' to, as long as it performs as a hand. > > >> Maybe it isn't always obvious that it's my hand... I believe the brain >> has an internal model of the body. I guess without one it wouldn't find it >> so easy to control it? A body's quite complicated, after all... >> > > Why should the model include its own non-functional presence though? > > > > Because the "model", the machine is not just confronted with its own > self-representation, but also with truth, as far as we are. Put > differently, because the machine can't conflate []p and []p & p. Only God > can do that. >
I don't see why self-representation would or could go beyond a simple inventory of functions. It seems a clear double standard to suggest on one hand that once a substitution level is met there can be no difference between your sun in law and a natural person, but on the other hand you are saying that of course machines can tell a difference between two identical functions just because one of them feels alien. Craig > Bruno > > > > > Craig > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
