On Saturday, March 1, 2014 1:52:12 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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> On 28 Feb 2014, at 03:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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> On Thursday, February 27, 2014 8:03:15 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
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>> On 28 February 2014 03:02, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote:
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>>>
>>> In other words, why, in a functionalist/materialist world would we need 
>>> a breakable program to keep telling us that our hand is not Alien?
>>>
>>> Or contrariwise, why do you need a breakable programme to tell you that 
>> it's your hand?
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> Sure, that too. It doesn't make sense functionally. What difference does 
> it make 'who' the hand 'belongs' to, as long as it performs as a hand.
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>> Maybe it isn't always obvious that it's my hand... I believe the brain 
>> has an internal model of the body. I guess without one it wouldn't find it 
>> so easy to control it? A body's quite complicated, after all...
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> Why should the model include its own non-functional presence though?
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> Because the "model", the machine is not just confronted with its own 
> self-representation, but also with truth, as far as we are. Put 
> differently, because the machine can't conflate []p and []p & p. Only God 
> can do that.
>

I don't see why self-representation would or could go beyond a simple 
inventory of functions. It seems a clear double standard to suggest on one 
hand that once a substitution level is met there can be no difference 
between your sun in law and a natural person, but on the other hand you are 
saying that of course machines can tell a difference between two identical 
functions just because one of them feels alien.

Craig


> Bruno
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> Craig
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