On 2 March 2014 16:55, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: >> There is an observable difference in the body with AHS: the subject says >> that it doesn't feel like his hand. > > > They don't have to say anything. They can keep their symptoms to themselves > if they want.
So can a blind person pretending to be able to see. The point is there is a *functional* difference because the behaviour is different. If there is no behavioural difference whatsoever then there is no disorder. >> This happens because the neural circuits between the hand and the language >> centres are disrupted. If they were not disrupted the language centres would >> get normal input and the subject would say everything was normal. > > > It doesn't matter why it happens, it matters that it cannot happen under > functionalism in the first place. By definition, consciousness is deflated > to the sum of a set of functions. The quality of inclusion or exclusion from > that set is simply a matter of fact, not a separate consideration. A program > can't decide that part of itself has a quality of not being itself. That has > no meaning to the function of the program. If the code works, then it is > part of the program, period. If it doesn't work, then it doesn't work, but > there is no language under functionalism to make that dysfunction related to > what amounts to the loss of soul. You can write a program that considers the right hand self and the left hand non-self, with the consequence that the right hand will be favoured if both hands are at risk of being lost, or whatever else you want to make "non-self" mean. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
