On 01 Mar 2014, at 13:06, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Friday, February 28, 2014 3:31:25 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
On Friday, February 28, 2014, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]>
wrote:
On Thursday, February 27, 2014 7:54:53 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
On 28 February 2014 01:05, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>
> On Thursday, February 27, 2014 4:13:22 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>>
>> On 26 February 2014 23:58, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]>
wrote:
>> >
>> >> "The alien hand syndrome, as originally defined, was used to
describe
>> >> cases involving anterior corpus callosal lesions producing
involuntary
>> >> movement and a concomitant inability to distinguish the
affected hand
>> >> from
>> >> an examiner's hand when these were placed in the patient's
unaffected
>> >> hand.
>> >> In recent years, acceptable usage of the term has broadened
>> >> considerably,
>> >> and has been defined as involuntary movement occurring in the
context
>> >> of
>> >> feelings of estrangement from or personification of the
affected limb
>> >> or its
>> >> movements. Three varieties of alien hand syndrome have been
reported,
>> >> involving lesions of the corpus callosum alone, the corpus
callosum
>> >> plus
>> >> dominant medial frontal cortex, and posterior cortical/
subcortical
>> >> areas. A
>> >> patient with posterior alien hand syndrome of vascular
aetiology is
>> >> reported
>> >> and the findings are discussed in the light of a
conceptualisation of
>> >> posterior alien hand syndrome as a disorder which may be less
>> >> associated
>> >> with specific focal neuropathology than are its callosal and
>> >> callosal-frontal counterparts." -
>> >> http://jnnp.bmj.com/content/68/1/83.full
>> >
>> >
>> > This kind of alienation from the function of a limb would seem to
>> > contradict
>> > functionalism. If functionalism identifies consciousness with
function,
>> > then
>> > it would seem problematic that a functioning limb could be seen
as
>> > estranged
>> > from the personal awareness, is it is really no different from
a zombie
>> > in
>> > which the substitution level is set at the body level. There is
no
>> > damage to
>> > the arm, no difference between one arm and another, and yet,
its is felt
>> > to
>> > be outside of one's control and its sensations are felt not to
be your
>> > sensations.
>> >
>> > This would be precisely the kind of estrangement that I would
expect to
>> > encounter during a gradual replacement of the brain with any
inorganic
>> > substitute. At the level at which food becomes non-food, so too
would
>> > the
>> > brain become non-brain, and any animation of the nervous system
would
>> > fail
>> > to be incorporated into personal awareness. The living brain
could still
>> > learn to use the prosthetic, and ultimately imbue it with its own
>> > articulation and familiarity to a surprising extent, but it is
a one way
>> > street and the prosthetic has no capacity to find the personal
awareness
>> > and
>> > merge with it.
>>
>> This example shows that if there is a lesion in the neural
circuitry
>> it affects consciousness. If you fix the lesion such that the
>> circuitry works properly but the consciousness is affected (keeping
>> the environmental input constant) then that implies that
consciousness
>> is generated by something other than the brain.
>
>
> Paying attention to the circuitry is a red herring. What I'm
bringing up is
> how dissociation of functions identified with the self does not
make sense
> for the functionalist view of consciousness. How do you give a
program
> 'alien subroutine syndrome'? Why does the program make a
distinction between
> the pure function of the subroutine and some feeling of belonging
that is
> generated by something other than the program?
I don't know why you distinguish between a function such as moving the
hand and identifying the hand as your own.
Because there is nothing that functionalism could allow 'your own'
to mean other than 'it is available to be used by the system'. The
alien hand is available to be used, but that is perceived to be
irrelevant. That is consistent with consciousness being a set of
aesthetic qualities and direct participation, but not consistent
with consciousness being a complex set of generic skills.
There must be some difference in the input from the hand or its
subsequent neural processing for it to be identified as foreign,
and this is consistent with the fact that there is a brain lesion in
alien hand syndrome.
I'm sure there is some difference, but it doesn't affect the
functionality of the hand. Under functionalism, since we can observe
no difference between the function of the body with or without AHS,
we should assume no such thing as AHS. If consciousness is like AHS,
and the hand is like the brain or body, then we should not be able
to see a difference between a conscious brain and simulation of
brain activity that is unconscious.
Both of these depend on
correctly working brain circuitry, which is why a brain lesion can
cause paralysis but can also cause alien hand syndrome.
The fact that the circuitry is damaged is irrelevant. The point is
that functionalism could never allow consciousness to become
separated from the functions of something else. Dis-ownership of
yourself or parts of yourself doesn't make sense if the function is
still there.
How can you say that the fact that the circuitry is damaged is
irrelevant?
Because I'm not talking about physiology, I'm talking about
philosophy. The functionalist principle of self does not hold up to
the reality of the self. AHS provides yet another example of how
functionalism underestimates the aesthetic value of sensation and
inflates the mechanical value of it.
It shows that what you consider mysterious consciousness stuff is
actually dependent on well defined physical processes.
Which are actually dependent on deeper self-defining sensory
experiences. I don't consider consciousness mysterious, nor do I
consider it stuff.
The alternative which would have made your point would be if the
consciousness changed but the brain did not.
If the quality of consciousness changes, then the behavior of the
brain is going to reflect that*, and vice versa. That has nothing to
do with the brain itself being independent of deeper substrates of
conscious interaction.
*From what we are seeing in psychedelics and NDE's, even that may be
too conservative a position. Since less brain activity can be
correlated to more aesthetic experience, mind-brain identity may yet
be disproved experimentally.
The usual brain-mind 1-1 identity thesis has been refuted by comp.
That's the whole UDA point.
Either way, it makes no difference to the big picture of physics
being dependent on sense rather than the other way around. Physics
has to make sense, but sense does not have to be physical.
It cannot. Once we assume comp. But you are using this against comp,
and so that use is not valid.
You confirm again that you talk like S4Grz (alias the machine soul,
the first person, []p & p).
Bruno
Craig
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Stathis Papaioannou
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