On Saturday, March 1, 2014, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > On Friday, February 28, 2014 3:31:25 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: > > > > On Friday, February 28, 2014, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Thursday, February 27, 2014 7:54:53 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: > > On 28 February 2014 01:05, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > On Thursday, February 27, 2014 4:13:22 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: > >> > >> On 26 February 2014 23:58, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> > > >> >> "The alien hand syndrome, as originally defined, was used to > describe > >> >> cases involving anterior corpus callosal lesions producing > involuntary > >> >> movement and a concomitant inability to distinguish the affected > hand > >> >> from > >> >> an examiner's hand when these were placed in the patient's > unaffected > >> >> hand. > >> >> In recent years, acceptable usage of the term has broadened > >> >> considerably, > >> >> and has been defined as involuntary movement occurring in the > context > >> >> of > >> >> feelings of estrangement from or personification of the affected > limb > >> >> or its > >> >> movements. Three varieties of alien hand syndrome have been > reported, > >> >> involving lesions of the corpus callosum alone, the corpus callosum > >> >> plus > >> >> dominant medial frontal cortex, and posterior cortical/subcortical > >> >> areas. A > >> >> patient with posterior alien hand syndrome of vascular aetiology is > >> >> reported > >> >> and the findings are discussed in the light of a conceptualisation > of > >> >> posterior alien hand syndrome as a disorder which may be less > >> >> associated > >> >> with specific focal neuropathology than are its callosal and > >> >> callosal-frontal counterparts." - > >> >> http://jnnp.bmj.com/content/68/1/83.full > >> > > >> > > >> > This kind of alienation from the function of a limb would seem to > >> > contradict > >> > functionalism. If functionalism identifies consciousness with > function, > >> > then > >> > it would seem problematic that a functioning limb could be seen as > >> > estranged > >> > from the personal awareness, is it is really no different from a > zombie > >> > in > >> > which the substitution level is set at the body level. There is no > >> > damage to > >> > the arm, no difference between one arm and another, and yet, its is > felt > >> > to > >> > be outside of one's control and its sensations are felt not to be > your > >> > sensations. > >> > > >> > This would be precisely the kind of estrangement that I would expect > to > >> > encounter during a gradual replacement of the brain with any > inorganic > >> > substitute. At the level at which food becomes non-food, so too would > >> > the > >> > brain become non-brain, and any animation of the nervous system would > >> > fail > >> > to be incorporated into personal awareness. The living brain could > still > >> > learn to use the prosthetic, and ultimately imbue it with its own > >> > articulation and familiarity to a surprising extent, but it is a one > way > >> > street and the prosthetic has no capacity to find the personal > awareness > >> > and > >> > merge with it. > >> > >> This example shows that if there is a lesion in the neural circuitry > >> it affects consciousness. If you fix the lesion such that the > >> circuitry works properly but the consciousness is affected (keeping > >> the environmental input constant) then that implies that consciousness > >> is generated by something other than the brain. > > > > > > Paying attention to the circuitry is a red herring. What I'm bringing up > is > > how dissociation of functions identified with the self does not make > sense > > for the functionalist view of consciousness. How do you give a program > > 'alien subroutine syndrome'? Why does the program make a distinction > between > > the pure function of the subroutine and some feeling of belonging that > is > > generated by something other than the progr > > > I'm sure there is some difference, but it doesn't affect the functionality > of the hand. Under functionalism, since we can observe no difference > between the function of the body with or without AHS, we should assume no > such thing as AHS. If consciousness is like AHS, and the hand is like the > brain or body, then we should not be able to see a difference between a > conscious brain and simulation of brain activity that is unconscious. > There is an observable difference in the body with AHS: the subject says that it doesn't feel like his hand. This happens because the neural circuits between the hand and the language centres are disrupted. If they were not disrupted the language centres would get normal input and the subject would say everything was normal. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
