On Saturday, March 8, 2014 8:49:38 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 08 Mar 2014, at 02:39, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: > > > On Saturday, March 8, 2014 12:49:58 AM UTC, Liz R wrote: >> >> On 8 March 2014 13:10, Edgar L. Owen <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Liz, >>> >>> No, you are referring to two different categories of ontological >>> assumption. >>> >>> There are some things we don't directly observe that we DEDUCE by logic >>> from what we can observe. That is true. >>> >> >> It's true of everything. We don't observe anything directly. Neuroscience >> indicates that what actually happens is "something inside our brains" but >> even that is a hypothesis. The existence of matter, energy, space, time, >> our brains, other people and so on are all hypotheses deduced from logic >> plus observation. >> > > I don't think it is true of everything. For example certain concepts like > the 'Mirror Pair' > >> >>> But my point is that everyone assumes we can directly observe empty >>> space because our mind makes an internal model of things existing IN such >>> an empty space. But those are purely mental constructs based on continuous >>> INTERPOLATIONS between actually observed dimensional relationships, and >>> there is no evidence that empty space actually exists outside of our >>> internal models of it. >>> >> > > > I acknowledge Russell, you, and whoever else making same point (though > different between you) are saying something that contains some sense of > being true. But I don't regard the reasoning as inherently substantial or > real either, in fact I think worrying about the realness of the external > world puts the cart before the horse. First dismiss internal value to > reason I should think. Look for a way that takes that non-existence > seriously. Firstly because it's harder that way, secondly because what you > end up with, if you end up at all, are powerful ways to proceed, that by > design stop worrying about externals in any direct sense at all. > > Another relative sense I'd deal with your empty space insight, is that > relative to everything else nothing is more strongly indicated than space. > If space isn't real but susbstance isthen we have a major problem of > density. We're still in the moment of the Big Bang in fact. In terms of > what's real, that means we have to share that moment with > the original/authentic moment. If space isn't real, which moment then is > real? In the end, isn't this more about preconceived notions of what 'real' > has to arrange like? > > It's like Bruno's idea that physical reality is not primatively real. > That's plausible enough, but then if it isn't, what we are left with is a > proxy-effect indistinguishable from the dimensional previous known as > physical reality. So it's actually a trivial point in context of where we > are, and what's around us. There's substance in terms of origins. But it's > very easy to use such things out of context. For example Bruno at one point > dismissed an argumnent I was making that drew on consistency of his model > to translate to physical layers, by saying such things didn't matter > because physical reality wasn't there. > > > Just to be precise, I never say that "physical reality is not there", only > that we have to explain it by an 1p-statistics on relative consistent > extensions, making comp (and Theaetetus) testable. > > Bruno > Sorry about that then. I thought you did say it right back at start of my foray into trying to understand computationalism over on FoAR
-- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
