On 17 March 2014 10:43, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On Sunday, March 16, 2014 6:21:18 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, March 17, 2014, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, March 16, 2014 10:02:04 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Monday, March 17, 2014, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sunday, March 16, 2014 1:02:08 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 14 March 2014 13:12, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZH2QXQu-HGE >>>>>>> >>>>>>> A brief, handy rebuttal to materialistic views of consciousness. I >>>>>>> would go further, and say that information, even though it is >>>>>>> immaterial in >>>>>>> its conception, is still derived from the principles of object >>>>>>> interaction. >>>>>>> Even when forms and functions are divorced from any particular physical >>>>>>> substance, they are still tethered to the third person omniscient view - >>>>>>> artifacts of communication *about* rather *appreciation of*. Real >>>>>>> experiences are not valued just because they inform us about something >>>>>>> or >>>>>>> other, they are valued because of their intrinsic aesthetic and semantic >>>>>>> content. It’s not even content, it is the experience itself. Information >>>>>>> must be made evident through sensory participation, or it is nothing at >>>>>>> all. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The thing is, this happens in the brain as well. You look at >>>>>> something, neurons fire, and there is no obvious reason why that should >>>>>> result in a particular sensation rather than another, or any sensation at >>>>>> all. And yet it does. If it's magic, then why can't the same magic happen >>>>>> with the computer? If it isn't magic, but a natural effect, then why >>>>>> can't >>>>>> the same natural effect happen with the computer? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> For the same reason that words on a page can't write a book. Computers >>>>> host meaningless patterns which we use to represent ideas that we find >>>>> significant. The patterns are not even patterns on their own, just the >>>>> presence of billions of disconnected micro-phenomenal states. >>>>> >>>> >>>> But if you look at a brain the patterns in it are no more meaningful >>>> than the patterns in a computer, and the matter in it is no more meaningful >>>> than the matter in a computer. >>>> >>> >>> Right. That's why we can't assume that the patterns that we see of other >>> bodies through our body is the relevant picture. It is the patterns which >>> we feel directly which are important as far as consciousness is concerned. >>> >> >> So why do you think the meaningless patterns and matter in a brain but >> not in a computer can be associated with consciousness? >> > > The brain is a public record of what we know to be a private human life, > the ultimate definition of which is unknown. A computer is a public record > of a known manufacturing process within a shared human experience. If you > only look at the public side, there is no private phenomena anyways, so it > is not surprising that we would assume that the public side should be > sufficient. > How do you know that a private computer life is not possible? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
