On 17 March 2014 10:43, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > On Sunday, March 16, 2014 6:21:18 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, March 17, 2014, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, March 16, 2014 10:02:04 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Monday, March 17, 2014, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sunday, March 16, 2014 1:02:08 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 14 March 2014 13:12, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZH2QXQu-HGE >>>>>>> >>>>>>> A brief, handy rebuttal to materialistic views of consciousness. I >>>>>>> would go further, and say that information, even though it is >>>>>>> immaterial in >>>>>>> its conception, is still derived from the principles of object >>>>>>> interaction. >>>>>>> Even when forms and functions are divorced from any particular physical >>>>>>> substance, they are still tethered to the third person omniscient view - >>>>>>> artifacts of communication *about* rather *appreciation of*. Real >>>>>>> experiences are not valued just because they inform us about something >>>>>>> or >>>>>>> other, they are valued because of their intrinsic aesthetic and semantic >>>>>>> content. It’s not even content, it is the experience itself. Information >>>>>>> must be made evident through sensory participation, or it is nothing at >>>>>>> all. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The thing is, this happens in the brain as well. You look at >>>>>> something, neurons fire, and there is no obvious reason why that should >>>>>> result in a particular sensation rather than another, or any sensation at >>>>>> all. And yet it does. If it's magic, then why can't the same magic happen >>>>>> with the computer? If it isn't magic, but a natural effect, then why >>>>>> can't >>>>>> the same natural effect happen with the computer? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> For the same reason that words on a page can't write a book. Computers >>>>> host meaningless patterns which we use to represent ideas that we find >>>>> significant. The patterns are not even patterns on their own, just the >>>>> presence of billions of disconnected micro-phenomenal states. >>>>> >>>> >>>> But if you look at a brain the patterns in it are no more meaningful >>>> than the patterns in a computer, and the matter in it is no more meaningful >>>> than the matter in a computer. >>>> >>> >>> Right. That's why we can't assume that the patterns that we see of other >>> bodies through our body is the relevant picture. It is the patterns which >>> we feel directly which are important as far as consciousness is concerned. >>> >> >> So why do you think the meaningless patterns and matter in a brain but >> not in a computer can be associated with consciousness? >> > > The brain is a public record of what we know to be a private human life, > the ultimate definition of which is unknown. A computer is a public record > of a known manufacturing process within a shared human experience. If you > only look at the public side, there is no private phenomena anyways, so it > is not surprising that we would assume that the public side should be > sufficient. > How do you know that a private computer life is not possible? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
