On 25 Mar 2014, at 04:24, LizR wrote:
"But Tegmark goes further. He doesn't say that the universe is
"isomorphic" to a mathematical structure; he says that it is that
structure, that its physical and mathematical existence are the same
thing."
I can see the appeal. If the universe ever does prove to be
isomorphic to a mathematical structure (and I'm sure that's a long,
long, long way from being proved at present) - by which I mean, if
the universe is exactly described by said structure, with nothing
else needed to completely describe reality - at that point, at
least, I would take Max's MUH seriously, if only because Ockham's
razor would indicate there was no point in hypothesising the
existence of two things that are exactly isomosphic.
However we are a long way from that point, and I imagine the nature
of knowledge and measurement and so on mean that we can never
actually reach it with 100% certainty.
But this means somehow you might not yet have fully grasped the UDA,
if you don't mind my frankness.
Indeed the UDA proves, up to a point, that if we take the idea that
consciousness is invariant for the comp digital substitution (even
relatively to a physical world) then the physical has eventually to be
redefined (if we still want to relate physics with correct first
person prediction) as a "probability calculus" on self-consistent and
computably accessible states.
So the physical reality is something quite distinct from the
mathematical, or the arithmetical reality. It is an inside phenomenon,
which generalizes Everett's embedding of the subject in the object
from the wave to arithmetic. Normally we should find back the wave, so
we can test the hypothesis.
No doubt that Tegmark is the physicist the closer to the comp's
consequence or to the Löbian universal number theology, but he is
still a bit naive in both philosophy of mind and in computer science,
and mathematics.
Like many he assumes comp implicitly or explicitly all the times, but
ignores the consequences like the FPI, or the incompleteness and its
intensional variants.
With comp the physical realities emerges from a statistical coherence
of a variety of first person plural arithmetical dreams. There isn a
relation physical reality, but the notion of universe is getting a bit
obscure.
Spivack was naive, but still correct about the consciousness flux
which is more fundamental that the physical, as consciousness is not
physical indeed, it is not really mathematical either, it is more
theological or computer science theoretical, or arithmetical "in the
eye of God". Spivack probably just confuses mechanism and materialism,
like many.
Concerning now the existence of a primitive physical universe, that is
really a speculation, despite taking for granted, by many again.
Nobody knows, and science has just not yet decided between Plato and
Aristotle for the fundamental question (most being still taboo).
Bruno
On 25 March 2014 15:07, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
-------- Original Message --------
Scott Aaronson reviews Max Tegmark's Our Mathematical Universe:
http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1753
The comments section includes Max Tegmark's remarks on Scott
Aaronson's remarks, ending for now with:
http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1753#comment-102790
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