On 26 March 2014 06:52, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On 25 Mar 2014, at 04:24, LizR wrote: > > "But Tegmark goes further. He doesn't say that the universe is > "isomorphic" to a mathematical structure; he says that it *is* that > structure, that its physical and mathematical existence are the same thing." > > I can see the appeal. If the universe ever *does* prove to be isomorphic > to a mathematical structure (and I'm sure that's a long, long, long way > from being proved at present) - by which I mean, if the universe is *exactly > described* by said structure, with nothing else needed to completely > describe reality - at that point, at least, I would take Max's MUH > seriously, if only because Ockham's razor would indicate there was no point > in hypothesising the existence of two things that are exactly isomosphic. > > However we are a long way from that point, and I imagine the nature of > knowledge and measurement and so on mean that we can never actually reach > it with 100% certainty. > > But this means somehow you might not yet have fully grasped the UDA, if > you don't mind my frankness. >
No of course I don't mind. I was wearing a "physicalist hat" what I wrote that.because I was replying to Brent who seems to assume physicalism, so I wasn't using a comp perspective. So I started from what I think is called an ultrafinitist view (?) and said that IF the universe proves isomorphic, etc, I would find myself forced to adjust that view. (But I am quite happy to admit I haven't perhaps grasped the UDA fully, too!) > > Indeed the UDA proves, up to a point, that if we take the idea that > consciousness is invariant for the comp digital substitution (even > relatively to a physical world) then the physical has eventually to be > redefined (if we still want to relate physics with correct first person > prediction) as a "probability calculus" on self-consistent and computably > accessible states. > > So the physical reality is something quite distinct from the mathematical, > or the arithmetical reality. It is an inside phenomenon, which generalizes > Everett's embedding of the subject in the object from the wave to > arithmetic. Normally we should find back the wave, so we can test the > hypothesis. > > No doubt that Tegmark is the physicist the closer to the comp's > consequence or to the Löbian universal number theology, but he is still a > bit naive in both philosophy of mind and in computer science, and > mathematics. > > Like many he assumes comp implicitly or explicitly all the times, but > ignores the consequences like the FPI, or the incompleteness and its > intensional variants. > > With comp the physical realities emerges from a statistical coherence of a > variety of first person plural arithmetical dreams. There isn a relation > physical reality, but the notion of universe is getting a bit obscure. > > Spivack was naive, but still correct about the consciousness flux which is > more fundamental that the physical, as consciousness is not physical > indeed, it is not really mathematical either, it is more theological or > computer science theoretical, or arithmetical "in the eye of God". Spivack > probably just confuses mechanism and materialism, like many. > > Concerning now the existence of a primitive physical universe, that is > really a speculation, despite taking for granted, by many again. > Nobody knows, and science has just not yet decided between Plato and > Aristotle for the fundamental question (most being still taboo). > Yes. On days with a "T" in them I allow myself to be more physicalist, but today is Wednesday and I am veering towards Plato again. > > Bruno > > > > > > On 25 March 2014 15:07, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> >> -------- Original Message -------- >> >> >> Scott Aaronson reviews Max Tegmark's *Our Mathematical Universe*: >> >> http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1753 >> >> The comments section includes Max Tegmark's remarks on Scott Aaronson's >> remarks, ending for now with: >> http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1753#comment-102790 >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
