On 26 March 2014 06:52, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > > On 25 Mar 2014, at 04:24, LizR wrote: > > "But Tegmark goes further. He doesn't say that the universe is > "isomorphic" to a mathematical structure; he says that it *is* that > structure, that its physical and mathematical existence are the same thing." > > I can see the appeal. If the universe ever *does* prove to be isomorphic > to a mathematical structure (and I'm sure that's a long, long, long way > from being proved at present) - by which I mean, if the universe is *exactly > described* by said structure, with nothing else needed to completely > describe reality - at that point, at least, I would take Max's MUH > seriously, if only because Ockham's razor would indicate there was no point > in hypothesising the existence of two things that are exactly isomosphic. > > However we are a long way from that point, and I imagine the nature of > knowledge and measurement and so on mean that we can never actually reach > it with 100% certainty. > > But this means somehow you might not yet have fully grasped the UDA, if > you don't mind my frankness. >
No of course I don't mind. I was wearing a "physicalist hat" what I wrote that.because I was replying to Brent who seems to assume physicalism, so I wasn't using a comp perspective. So I started from what I think is called an ultrafinitist view (?) and said that IF the universe proves isomorphic, etc, I would find myself forced to adjust that view. (But I am quite happy to admit I haven't perhaps grasped the UDA fully, too!) > > Indeed the UDA proves, up to a point, that if we take the idea that > consciousness is invariant for the comp digital substitution (even > relatively to a physical world) then the physical has eventually to be > redefined (if we still want to relate physics with correct first person > prediction) as a "probability calculus" on self-consistent and computably > accessible states. > > So the physical reality is something quite distinct from the mathematical, > or the arithmetical reality. It is an inside phenomenon, which generalizes > Everett's embedding of the subject in the object from the wave to > arithmetic. Normally we should find back the wave, so we can test the > hypothesis. > > No doubt that Tegmark is the physicist the closer to the comp's > consequence or to the Löbian universal number theology, but he is still a > bit naive in both philosophy of mind and in computer science, and > mathematics. > > Like many he assumes comp implicitly or explicitly all the times, but > ignores the consequences like the FPI, or the incompleteness and its > intensional variants. > > With comp the physical realities emerges from a statistical coherence of a > variety of first person plural arithmetical dreams. There isn a relation > physical reality, but the notion of universe is getting a bit obscure. > > Spivack was naive, but still correct about the consciousness flux which is > more fundamental that the physical, as consciousness is not physical > indeed, it is not really mathematical either, it is more theological or > computer science theoretical, or arithmetical "in the eye of God". Spivack > probably just confuses mechanism and materialism, like many. > > Concerning now the existence of a primitive physical universe, that is > really a speculation, despite taking for granted, by many again. > Nobody knows, and science has just not yet decided between Plato and > Aristotle for the fundamental question (most being still taboo). > Yes. On days with a "T" in them I allow myself to be more physicalist, but today is Wednesday and I am veering towards Plato again. > > Bruno > > > > > > On 25 March 2014 15:07, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > >> >> >> >> -------- Original Message -------- >> >> >> Scott Aaronson reviews Max Tegmark's *Our Mathematical Universe*: >> >> http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1753 >> >> The comments section includes Max Tegmark's remarks on Scott Aaronson's >> remarks, ending for now with: >> http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1753#comment-102790 >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
