On 25 Mar 2014, at 21:37, Richard Ruquist wrote:
On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 11:17 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 24 Mar 2014, at 20:18, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno,
How does cloning differ from "asking the doctor".
Forgive me but it seems that you are being contradictory-
just to indicate that this is an important question.
No problem: I love all questions :)
The non cloning theorem says that you cannot copy exactly a *quantum
state*. Note that you can still teleport it quantum mechanically,
but you have to detsroy "the original".
But nobody pretends that your mind needs your exact quantum state.
It needs only a substitution level, which is usually estimate to be
at a quite higher level than the quantum state.
You cannot clone this or that exemplary of "Alice in Wonderland",
but it is easy to make a copy of its classical information content,
which is way above the quantum level defining the "material" book.
Bruno, My concern is at what level is consciousness. I suspect that
if it is below the substitution level, then consciousness will not
be transmitted
Quentin did clarify this. Are you OK with what he said? By definition,
*a* substitution level is a level of description of your brain/body/
environment such that a copy at that level will preserve exactly your
consciousness/personality.
By definition, if we copy you at a lower level, you will surivive.
If we copy your body/brain at a higher level, you might still survive
and stay conscious, but, by definition, you will notice a difference,
or someone else will notice a difference. Anyway, there will be a
difference, in God's eye. You might feel a headache, or be stoned, or
something. You might also not survive at all, if the level is too much
above, or if inadequate. To treat this we need the thought experience
with amnesia or altered state of consciousness, which are more
difficult (and usually avoided and not needed in the derivation of
physics).
All the same with this present post. Once send it will be
multiplied, without any information loss, to all participant to this
forum.
Right, except that I suspect that the post is not conscious.
Me too. But with comp, a mental state can temporarily be put on an
hard disk.
Now, I should add that the consequence of comp remains correct, even
if our substitution level is sub quantum, and asks for the total
quantum state. WHY? because the consequences depends only on step 7,
which does not use any duplication of any states, but only their
multi-preparation, which is done automatically by the arithmetical
reality, or the Universal Dovetailer. Only the pedagogical step 1-6
are no more available except ... as pedagogical steps. But a
majority of people believe that the brain, although plausibly a
quantum object, works at a much higher level, so I don't insist so
much on this, given that we get a non-cloning result directly by comp.
OK?
Right, and I suspect that consciousness could be duplicated
if the consciousness level is at or above the substitution level.
OK.
Seems we have several levels:
the particle and quantum levels, and the consciousness and the
substitution level, The conscious level is fixed by nature.
The substitution level seems to be fixed by mathematics.
They are the same. The consciousness level is defined, when assuming
comp, by the substitution level. See Quentin posts.
Note that the substitution level is unknowable, even by the person
doing the teleportation experience, despite "surviving" will *seem* to
him/her to be a string argument in favor of comp, and it might be in
his 1p view, but he cannot use it as a public 3p proofs. The existence
of Anosognosia can be used to illustrate this. Imagine the person who
after having a digital brain transplant says "I have survived"
repetitively without ever stopping, like if the hyppocamus was not
functionning, he might believe having perfectly survived for a time,
but is wrong. The survival is 3-1p, and is not denibale
constructively. This has made me anxious that physics could not been
constructively derived from arithmetic, but this does not follow
either, as AUDA eventually illustrates.
They both may be the same: nature and math, that is.
That is a consequence indeed.
Bruno
Richard
Bruno
Richard
On Mon, Mar 24, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 24 Mar 2014, at 00:43, Joseph Knight wrote:
Bruno, I've seen you say before that COMP (in addition to the
first-person indeterminacy) also predicts the no-cloning theorem.
Could you explain how?
In a purely qualitative way, that should be easy, if you succeed in
staying naive-cold with the UDA up to step 7. Imagine that I decide
to copy a piece of matter.
Unlike information, where things are crisp at some point, it is
already not clear what is the relevant level, so an exact copy
should be defined by something like a non distinguishability with
respect to some set of instruments.
Anyway, at some point, in your zooming toward finer and finer
description of the piece of matter, you arrive at your own
substitution level. At that level, the matter is no more made of
subpart, but is undetermined, as you comp state is no more
dependent of such details, and *you* diffuse on all the possible
"subcomputations", where, by the FPI, all universal machines are
somehow in competition (by the invariance of the 1p for the "length
of the proof of the sigma_1 proposition, or computations). How
could you clone that? We cannot clone an object, because an object
is not a real thing, but an information pattern, which becomes
necessarily fuzzy when we look at it below the substitution level.
What we can see there is only an average of the many possible
computations below our (first person plural) substitution level.
OK?
Bruno
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