On 3/25/2014 6:52 PM, Joseph Knight wrote:
It is trivially a theorem of COMP, since the existence of such a substitution level is the COMP axiom itself. If COMP is true, then the substitution level is unknowable (although it can be honed in upon scientifically).
I have trouble with this. How would you know if your consciousness were different after the substitution? I generally don't know why thought A comes to me instead of thought B. I can see that after the substitution you could ask your friends if you seemed different and you could compare your remembered past actions and feelings to present ones in similar circumstances; but it seems to me it would be impossible to say with any confidence that you had "survived" as a stream of consciousness. If your friends said to acted similar to before, maybe a little different, couldn't it be with quite rather different internal narrative - just as a good actor could pretend and act like you.
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