I would like to read those papers but haven't had time yet.
On 23 April 2014 04:00, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 22 Apr 2014, at 02:03, Pierz wrote: > > Just came across this presentation: > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEaecUuEqfc > > It's a bit long, but I'd be interested to hear anyone's thoughts who is > knowledgeable on QM. I don't follow the maths, but I kind of got the gist. > What intrigued me was his interpretation of QM and I'm wondering if anyone > can throw any more light on it. He makes a lot of jumps which are obviously > clear in his mind but hard to follow. He says that MWI is supportable by > the maths, but that he prefers a "zero universes" interpretation, according > to which we are classical simulations in a quantum computer. I'm not sure I > follow this. I mean, I can follow the idea of being a classical simulation > in a quantum computer, but I can't see how this is different from MWI, > except by the manoeuvre of declaring other universes to be unreal because > they can never practically interact with 'our' branch. I guess what > interested me was the possibility of a coherent alternative to MWI (because > frankly MWI scares the willies out of me), > > > Me too. But at some deeper level my open-mindedness on this is > "protected" by an even bigger fear: the fear to get it wrong. > > > but in spite of what he said, I couldn't see what it was... > > > Physicists are unclear on what they mean by "world". I agree with you: to > be a classical emulation in a quantum computer is basically equivalent with > the MWI, assuming computationalism and a level above the quantum level. > > Computationalism can be ontologically simpler, as all there is needed is > the number 0, and its successors, s(0), s(s(0)), ... and nothing else. (the > dreams will emerge from the additive-multiplicative relations). > > This is automatically a 0 worlds a priori. But sharable dreams can cohere > enough to make open the question if we are in a complete (in some sense) > physical reality (one universe), or one multiverse, or a cluster of > multiverses, etc. But this is only from inside, because from "outside", all > what exists are the piece of dreams which cohere (enough or not). > > Here "dream" means "computation from some point of view". > > That is what is translated in arithmetic by "sigma_1" and provable by a > machine ("me" in 3p), in a consistent environment, that is "[]p & <>t", > with p an arithmetical sigma_1 sentence. (+ the "theaetetus nuance: []p & > <>t & p). > > Is there a consolation for the MWI fears? > > Well "MWI" is not the explanation, it is the whole "theology" which is the > explanation, and things are complex there, especially after 1500 years of > "no mind change" on this. You might really read Plato, neoplatonists, the > mystics, and study the comparison with some eastern school, ... and with > actual machine's self-reference. > > Bruno > > *Life, what is it, but a dream. (*Lewis Carroll*)* > > > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
