On 10 May 2014 22:12, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote:

> On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 8:30 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>> On 10 May 2014 17:30, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, May 10, 2014, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I guess one could start from "is physics computable?" (As Max Tegmark
>>>> discusses in his book, but I haven't yet read what his conclusions are, if
>>>> any). If physics is computable and consciousness arises somehow in a
>>>> "materialist-type way" from the operation of the brain, then consciousness
>>>> will be computable by definition.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Is that trivially obvious to you? The anti-comp crowd claim that even if
>>> brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a computer could be
>>> conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter, and not just a
>>> simulation, to generate the consciousness.
>>>
>>> If physics is computable, and consciousness arises from physics with
>> nothing extra (supernatural or whatever) then yes. Am I missing something
>> obvious?
>>
>
> Yeah, I always feel the same about this sort of argument. It seems so
> trivial to disprove:
>
> "even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a computer
> could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter, and not
> just a simulation, to generate the consciousness."
>
> 1. If brain behaviour is computable and (let's say comp)
> 2. brain generates consciousness but
> 3. it requires actual brain matter to do so then
> 4. brain behaviour is not computable (~comp)
>
> so comp = ~comp
>
> I also wonder if I'm missing something, since I hear this one a lot.
>
> OK, but if *physics* is computable then the rest follows (doesn't it) ?

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