On 5/11/2014 4:01 PM, LizR wrote:
On 12 May 2014 07:13, meekerdb <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:On 5/11/2014 12:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Yes, the rest follows, but the negation of the rest follows too, unless, like Peter Jones, you add a criterion of primitive physical existence to what is needed for consciousness. But then the movie graph can show that they attribute a magical role to that primitive matter. The idea, for them, is that there is a primitive matter, and that "the primitive character" is not Turing emulable. But if the entangled and holistic character of the world requires that the Turing emulation extend to essentially all of it then "primitive matter" just means "exists in the emulation". Turing *emulation* is only meaningful in the context of emulating one part relative to another part that is not emulated, i.e. is "real". That's why I think the MGA doesn't prove what you think it does. It is still the case that something playing the role of "primitive matter - per Peter Jones" is necessary in every world, and that role is to pick out what exists from what doesn't. If materialism is correct, this is tautologically true. If it isn't, it isn't.
No, my view is that it is necessarily true. That if you have a world, even one in arithmetic, it must have some things that exist and some that don't (otherwise you have the "white rabbit" problem) and those things that exist in the most fundamental sense are what we call "material", i.e. "primitive material" is just a marker we use to say what exists in a world. It's not primitive mathematics or primitive arithmetic because those are too profligate - their kind of existence entails much more than a world; it entails all possible worlds within an axiomatic system.
(Comp and "mathematical structure" theories don't need anything to "breathe fire into the equations" as far as I know - no phlogiston!)
No, they need something to keep them from blowing up from too much "fire". Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
