On 7/7/2014 3:18 PM, LizR wrote:
On 8 July 2014 07:13, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
On 7/7/2014 8:14 AM, David Nyman wrote:
We can clearly understand in what way Mark Twain and Sam Clemens were
identical, but it is somewhat less easy to fathom in any equivalent
sense how such heterogeneous concepts as mind and brain could share
that relation.
But that's just an argument from incredulity.
This incredulity isn't /necessarily/ misplaced, however, as this later comment
shows:
*Merely* operational! Metaphorical is easy. Talk is cheap. Operational is
hard.
"Operational" is what I assume you want to show is achievable in the exchange quoted
above - to get the mind as the operational result of the brain. And, as you say,
operational is hard ... or impossible, if one is, in fact, trying to match up
heterogeneous concepts
That's where, as Bruno says, you have to make your bet. He bets that logically provable =
believed. Most people who've thought about it bet on "comp" = "the functional digital
replacement of a brain". But this implies philosophical zombies are impossible, which
implies that if we create human like behavior we will automatically have created
consciousness. Note this is a specific kind of consciousness. I think Bruno's idea of
consciousness is much broader (maybe too broad).
Brent
(as I suspect is the case for "Tronnies", for example, alas). Whether that is the case
here is something the scientific community is trying to look into, but so far it seems
to have barely scratched the surface. We still have no idea how (or if) the brain
generates consciousness, or indeed what consciousness is, or if it's even something that
can be defined, or if it's merely the appearance of something, like aether and
phlogiston. Admittedly the appearance argument begs the question a bit, of exactly who
is experiencing this illusory something, but I assume that could be answered too -
perhaps it's a "Self Image Module". (I'm sure someone out there has the relevant brain
damage to show what happens when one doesn't have one of these, assuming such a thing
exists).
That's why it's the "hard problem", I guess.
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