On 6 July 2014 04:18, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >> Yes, but it's a theory of epistemology "after the physical fact". It >> assumes without further justification what it wishes to prove, > > No, it defines a certain kind of belief, just as Bruno identifies belief with "provable in some axiomatic system" (which you must admit is not a standard meaning of "belief") one can identify belief with certain actions in context. I don't know what you mean by "after the physical fact". If it's a physical theory of belief then of course it's explained in terms of physical facts. You seem to reject this as though it's obviously wrong.
Not wrong, just not the whole story. My argument has been that any "mechanism of belief" that is hierarchically reducible to a finite set of (assumptive) primitives cannot thereafter rely on the (supposedly) independent effectiveness of derivative notions such as computation as the basis of its "mechanism of knowledge". This is essentially the same conclusion as MGA or Maudlin and amounts to an insistence on what is most powerful in reductive explanation (i.e. the redundancy of intermediate "levels of effectiveness") . Hence the specific line of attack is that, under reductionism, the effectiveness of derivative notions such as "physical computation" cannot be meaningfully distinguished from that of their ontological primitives. Since this isn't always obvious, I've offered suggestions, closer to hand than the hierarchical relation between micro and macro physical phenomena, to exemplify the similarly tacit reification of supernumerary ontological assumptions (e.g. mountains, football teams, societies, etc.). > It may be inadequate or Bruno's theory may be better, but you seem to think it's somehow heretical to have a physical idea of what constitutes belief. Well, It is at least my intention to make clear what I actually think so that you don't have to rely on what I may "seem" to think. But if my argument goes through, what is left to a reductionist strategy would look like some kind of mind<->brain, or more properly mind<->reductive-primitive, identity theory. But then the burden would be on finding a convincing justification of "identical", in this non-standard sense, that doesn't amount to effective elimination of the first term. We can clearly understand in what way Mark Twain and Sam Clemens were identical, but it is somewhat less easy to fathom in any equivalent sense how such heterogeneous concepts as mind and brain could share that relation. So no, there's no "heresy" involved in such an idea unless, IMHO, it is a blind for eliminativism. But the risk in any straightforward equation of the "physical idea of what constitutes belief" with some parallel physical account, however exhaustive, is that of consigning the "1p part" to some not-available-for-explanation limbo. >> One might therefore say that >> action, belief and truth are hypothesised as being complementary or >> co-effective, rather than hierarchical-reductive, in relation. > > Truth in comp only refers to mathematical truth of the form Exf(x). It's a long way to connect that to "I see a dog." True enough it's a long way, but it might yet be a first step on the right path. By contrast, I don't see how any equivalent truth-relation can be tacked on to reductive physicalism except as an act of courtesy. What can it mean to say that the physical evolution of some particularised system corresponds to a "self-referential truth" (i.e. a "subjective reality" transcendent over its physical states) other than as an ad hoc attribution in the face of an indisputable a posteriori fact? Of course, sans a viable theory of mind, this latter position is indeed the one we find ourselves in. But what we really seek is some explanatory framework within which such relations as "believes", "knows" and "acts" can be conciliated on something more than a merely metaphorical or operational basis. >> Beyond that >> commonality, the spectrum of subjectivity (i.e. its possible >> "objects") would extend asymptotically towards infinity, I guess, but >> always according to the specifics of the logic and statistics >> extractable from comp. At least, that is the hypothesis and the >> project. > > OK, I can buy that. OK, sold. How many would you like? ;-) David > On 7/5/2014 5:08 AM, David Nyman wrote: >> >> On 5 July 2014 06:27, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >> >>> Ok, maybe it's mostly a matter of semantics. I don't exclude things as not >>> existing just because they are not part of the primitive ontology. >> >> But of course I haven't been saying these things don't exist. On the >> contrary, I've been labouring to differentiate, for the sake of this >> discussion, two distinct senses of "existence". The first sense picks >> out the basic ontology of a theory and the second refers to whatever >> can (putatively) be derived from that ontology on the basis of further >> epistemological considerations. And I've been pointing out that >> nothing whose "existence" is picked out only in the the latter sense >> can be claimed as having any independent relevance (ex hypothesi >> reductionism) in the evolution of states defined in terms of the >> former. >> >>> In physics the stuff that is most "primitive" in a model is also stuff who's >>> existence is least certain, e.g. strings, super-symmetric particles, >>> space-time quanta,... While the stuff you would say doesn't really exist is >>> the most certain - including the instruments used to infer the primitive >>> stuff and records of the data taken. >> >> That's simply not relevant to the point under discussion. Of course >> what's most certain is whatever is directly epistemologically >> available, but we're discussing what our theories may actually imply >> if we take them *seriously*. The hypothesised ontology may be far less >> certain, but we are persuaded to entertain it in the first place >> precisely because we conjecture that the things of which we *are* >> certain are ultimately its complex epistemological derivatives. >> >>>> But this ceases to >>>> be the case when we propose a second-order relation like computation >>>> as the "physical correlate" of consciousness, precisely because it >>>> vitiates the idea that such relations can be anything other than a >>>> manner of speaking, in terms of the *ontology* of a reductive physical >>>> theory. Hence, to attribute the ability to evoke conscious states to >>>> such imaginary or virtual relations would seem to invoke a sort of >>>> ontological magic. >>> >>> I don't see it as any more magic than making mountains out of rocks. You >>> seem to be invoking an argument from incredulity: Consciousness just can't >>> be made out of physical stuff or processes. >> >> It doesn't take magic to make mountains out of rocks; it requires only >> that we respect the distinction in a theory between an ontology and >> its epistemological derivatives. What I was saying is that, under >> physical reductionism, we can't coherently claim the "ontology of >> consciousness" to be computation, because the relata picked out by >> computation simply can't be justified as being independently >> effective. The relata of computation are, ex hypothesi, >> epistemologically derivative, abstractions of a *uniquely effective >> micro-physical ontology*: "strings, super-symmetric particles, >> space-time quanta". This ineluctable degeneracy to the basement >> entails that, if you want consciousness to be "made out of physical >> stuff or processes", that's where you'll find your parts kit. >> >> But in any case it is surely rather obvious that we have no business >> looking for consciousness to be "made out of stuff", unless we are >> willing to take the stuff alone (i.e. the 3p part) to be consciousness >> tout court. That would be to eliminate the 1p part and if we stick >> closely to our theoretical analysis such elimination is obviously >> incoherent on its face, as the very claim invokes the epistemological >> derivatives it purports to exclude. Of course I know this isn't what >> you mean: you accept the 1p part. But the point of my analysis has >> been to argue that unless we are prepared to consign the latter to >> mystery (i.e. inaccessibility to further explanation) we should >> perhaps question whether we aren't being misled by very idea of >> consciousness being "made out of something". >> >>>> Arithmetic, in the first instance, is simply >>>> posited as the minimal ontological assumption for the construction of >>>> an explicit epistemology (i.e. a theory of knowledge and knowers); IOW >>>> what physics explicitly eschews at the outset. From that point the >>>> explanatory thrust hinges on epistemological considerations and hence >>>> can no longer be straightforwardly reduced to the first-order >>>> ontology. >>> >>> Yes, that's an interesting aspect of Bruno's theory. He identifies >>> "provable" with "believes". But the the same kind of thing can be done in a >>> physical theory: "believes" = "acts as if it were true". There's even a >>> whole theory of Bayesian inference based on bets. It may not be right, but >>> it's a theory of epistemology. >> >> Yes, but it's a theory of epistemology "after the physical fact". It >> assumes without further justification what it wishes to prove, > > No, it defines a certain kind of belief, just as Bruno identifies belief with "provable in some axiomatic system" (which you must admit is not a standard meaning of "belief") one can identify belief with certain actions in context. I don't know what you mean by "after the physical fact". If it's a physical theory of belief then of course it's explained in terms of physical facts. You seem to reject this as though it's obviously wrong. It may be inadequate or Bruno's theory may be better, but you seem to think it's somehow heretical to have a physical idea of what constitutes belief. > > >> as when >> we speak of "acting as if it were true" we have *already abstracted* >> both ourselves and our actions from the framework of an exhaustive >> physical reduction that has been hypothesised at the outset as being >> uniquely effective. > > > Sure, it's a physical theory so it's in terms of physics. > > >> That's the whole point and burden of my analysis. >> So on that basis I disagree that "the same kind of thing can be done >> in a physical theory". On the comp assumption, by contrast, belief in >> a truth and "acting as if true", in conjunction with their truth >> content, are alike derived from the outset as consequences of a >> fundamentally epistemological theory. > > > A consequence of a hypothetical definition. And I don't see that comp has been able to derive anything about human actions. Not to say that can never do so, but I don't see it as a de facto virtue. > > >> One might therefore say that >> action, belief and truth are hypothesised as being complementary or >> co-effective, rather than hierarchical-reductive, in relation. > > > Truth in comp only refers to mathematical truth of the form Exf(x). It's a long way to connect that to "I see a dog." > > >> >>>> I think in the case of consciousness, explanation as opposed to >>>> engineering has to take foundational questions of knowledge and >>>> reference as seriously as those of physical phenomenology. And I also >>>> think comp at least provides a possible model of how progress could be >>>> made in this direction. >>> >>> But not a physical, neuroscience based model. You reject that, in spite of >>> the fact that it has had considerable success. >> >> I don't reject it at all. I'm only going so far as saying that >> ultimately it may lack the explanatory moxie to take us as far as we >> could go under more comprehensive assumptions. > > Ok, so long as you say "may". > > >> Your stance, I think, >> is that wherever a future neuroscience is capable of taking us is as >> far as any reasonable person could expect explanation to reach. To put >> it more baldly, whatever can't be known in this way just isn't >> knowable. All I've really been trying to argue for in this thread is >> that this limit may in the end turn out to be an artefact of a >> particular explanatory strategy. > > > Maybe. Maybe not. Even in Bruno's theory not everything true is knowable. > > >> >> As to success, I don't recall Einstein being taken to task for dissing >> the "considerable success" of Newton's theory. In the end any >> paradigm, however successful, may suffer the fate of being subsumed >> into a more comprehensive one if certain puzzles stubbornly resist it >> for long enough. And I'm suggesting that one early but perhaps >> worrying symptom that this fate may lie somewhere up the road for >> physical reductionism is a persistent tendency to trivialise, mystify, >> or eliminate epistemological puzzles that seem to resist capture >> within the framework of that theory. >> >>> So what does an answer look like? Is Turing completeness enough - that's >>> what Bruno says. But apparently it makes you and a jumping spider equally >>> conscious. I don't think that's a very good answer. >> >> Where is it written that I and a jumping spider are equally conscious? >> That is, on the assumption that I'm not actually a jumping spider, >> which I guess is not a matter for complete certainty, in the >> cyberverse. I think that comp implies only that I and a jumping spider >> may share a particular species of self-referentiality that is >> representable in any Turing complete system (indeed, that this is the >> basis of the "I" shared by all such subjects). Beyond that >> commonality, the spectrum of subjectivity (i.e. its possible >> "objects") would extend asymptotically towards infinity, I guess, but >> always according to the specifics of the logic and statistics >> extractable from comp. At least, that is the hypothesis and the >> project. > > > OK, I can buy that. > > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
