On 7/9/2014 7:08 PM, LizR wrote:
On 10 July 2014 13:48, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
It proves that Bruno's MGA doesn't dispense with physics. When
instantiating
consciousness it's necessary to either allow the consciousness to act
within our
physical world or to provide another computed world within which it can act.
Or provide inputs which give the appearance of a world, yes. Otherwise you have a
consciousness that is in sensory isolation (although it could still dream).
In either case the physics is necessary to the consciousness - to avoid the
problem
of the rock that computes everything.
The rock wouldn't compute /everything/, not being a UD with infinite time, but it might
compute some things. I'm not sure why this is a problem, however. Can you explain why?
It's a problem because most of the argument about comp depends on intuititions and
reductios: You must believe in arithmetic (every body does, it's absurd not to) therefore
you believe in the existence of the UD because it's just a number and relations between
numbers. But when an argument implies that I should believe in X because the contrary is
absurd and then I realize that the argument also implies Y which I find absurd it makes
the argument less convincing.
I don't think Bruon actually claims to get rid of physics anyway, it just
sounds
that way sometimes when he's being short, but then it's taken as a
refutation of
materialism.
I'm not sure about physics. I think the point of the MGA is that matter isn't primary?
(As I've already mentioned, I'm not 100% au fait with the MGA.)
It tries to show that by leading you to accept a scenario in which there is no physical
action but which you believe is computing consciousness (of a dream).
I take it as an argument for monism; physics is necessary for consciousness
I'm not sure what this means. Comp assumes that computation is necessary for
consciousness, and in practice, for us to carry out computation requires physics to
support it,
That's the point of Bruno's argument, physics is not necessary to support it - rather
computation supports physics AND consciousness.
of course - but that doesn't mean it's /necessary/ for computation. Computation might be
able to exist in Numberland, or so I'm told.
(it's just not necessary that physics be fundamental, whatever that means).
It means it doesn't emerge from anything else.
But what is "it"? I think "physics" is just whatever we intersubjectively agree on (aka
"objective"). That's why "physics" went from inherent tendencies in substances
(Aristotle) to particles (Laplace) to fields (Maxwell) to Hilbert space (Dirac) to the MUH
(Tegmark). So can we agree on something being fundamental without it being physics?
But if physics isn't primary then there's no argument anyway, because as far as I can
tell comp seems quite happy with non-primary physics.
Bruno's happy along as long as there's theology.
Brent
He's like a philosopher who says, "I know it's possible in
practice. Now I'd like to know whether it's possible in
principle."
--- Daniel Dennett, on Michael Behe
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