I have no idea whether this insight will lead, in the end, to a correct TOE, but it
seems clear that it does require computation to take explanatory priority over physics.
David
On 8/23/2014 9:09 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 23 August 2014 05:02, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
/What we observe in practice are physical devices of various kinds
(indeed,
in principle, indefinitely many kinds) that we accept FAPP as
adequately
instantiating particular classes of computation within certain
fairly
stringent limits./
/
/
/What we observe, aside from observing our own thoughts and maybe even
then, is
always theory laden. Partly we see the world through a theory of
objects that
evolution has provided us, sort of naive physics, but a theory
nonetheless as
optical illusions demonstrate./
And the relevance of this remark to my point is what, precisely?
Just a cautionary remark that observing a physical device already involves
assumptions that it is an experience that can in principle be shared and
agreed on
by other observers - i.e. that it assumes some physics.
/To put it another way, we are prepared to interpret the normal
physical
behaviour of such devices *as if* it instantiated the mathematical
notion
of computation./
/
/
/Right, because it usually (modulo a dropped bit or so) does./
Obviously. And your point is...?
/These considerations should make it clear that any description of
the
normal behaviour of a physical device as computation can only be in
a sense
that is, ultimately, metaphorical./
/
/
/I think you are too hung up on ontology. You denigrate everything
that's not
in terms of the ur-stuff of (some unknown) true ontology as metaphor or
fiction. Why not accept that knowledge, including knowledge of
ontology, is
always provisional and uncertain and it's best to think of it as a model
summarizing our best idea - but not necessarily the one TRUE idea./
Maybe you are getting a little too hung up on what you imagine me to be
hung up on.
If that is the case, it might make you somewhat unreceptive at the outset
to what
you assume to be my line of argument. I'm not trying to grind any axe in
particular
but only to articulate what I suspect are sometimes unrecognised
assumptions as
clearly as I can and then examine the consequences. Of course I may well be
wrong
on any point and so my aim is to encourage discussion from which I might
learn.
In this particular case what I'm driving at isn't that either matter or
computation
need be considered as some kind of mystical "ur-stuff" (whatever that would
be).
What I'm questioning is whether it is really coherent to attribute
*first-person*
consciousness to "computation" against the background of any theory that is
committed to a physically primitive level of explanation.
You're saying it may be incoherent to reduce consciousness to computation,
if
computation is reducible to physics? Why would that be incoherent? Must
'reduction'
necessarily be reduction to the bottom to be coherent? Or are you assuming
consciousness can't be reducible to physics therefore it can't be reducible
to some
intermediate (computation) that risks be reducible to physics?
I know you cross swords with Bruno over the meaning of primitive in this
context,
but I don't see why this has to be problematic. Primitive simply means the
level of
explanation to which it is *assumed* every other level can be reduced.
I think we only "cross swords" when Bruno implies that any reduction of
consciousness to physical processes is the same as asserting that some
(undefined)
physics is primitive. The way theoretical physics has developed over the
last
century I wouldn't be surprised if someone developed a fundamental theory
of physics
based on homotopy theory or knots or numbers. But it wouldn't affect the
reduction
of chemistry to physics and it might not affect the reduction of
computation to
physics. I take "physics" to mean the most fundamental science of what we
can
empirically agree on - whatever it's ontology is. I think Bruno only
differs in
that he thinks we can agree on things that are not empirical, like
arithmetic.
The point is not that we can know any particular theory of this sort to be
TRUE,
but only that we should rigorously pursue its consequences *as if it were*.
My point then is that we should start by treating a theory of physical
primitivism
"as if true". If so, it is only consistent to suppose that any phenomenon
under
consideration in terms of that theory must be assumed to be adequately and
fully
accountable (at least in principle) at its lowest level of physical
reduction. You
persistently demur from this line of argument, but I think you miss my
point, which
is entirely harmless in every case except (I contend) that of the "1p part"
of
consciousness. It is entirely possible to understand a
physically-instantiated
computation (and hence, on CTM, an associated state of consciousness) to be
the
same physical process regardless of the "level of reduction" at which it is
considered. After all, any such "level" is, in the end, merely a term of art
associated with the theory in question. But what I'm questioning is whether
it is
coherent to (tacitly) treat the 1p part as merely such a term of art.
?? Does "term of art" imply a third person description?
My sense is that you equivocate on this, because if we only consider the 3p
part
(as in your analogy of the Mars Rover) the point (i.e. 3p-reducibility) is
indeed
harmless. But the 1p part resists 1p-reduction. It stubbornly is what it
is. Hence
my question essentially is about the kind of theory required to make sense
of
associating an irreducible 1p part with a reducible 3p part. AFAICS such a
question
cannot even be posed coherently in terms of physical primitivism.
Suppose that you have a theory which reliably tells you which 1p qualia go
with
which 3p brain processes (the engineering level solution to the mind-body
problem).
Does that "make sense of associating an irreducible 1p part with a
reducible 3p
part."? Or are you saying that such an association can't be a brute fact?
Indeed you have suggested that it is unreasonable to ask for this. What
inclines me
to Bruno's ideas (assuming CTM of course) is that this particular question
may be
better posed in terms of a theory that takes computation, not physics, as
its
primitive.
Yes, I agree that it might be. But even if it provides a better answer to
the
relation of qualia to brains, that doesn't make it a better TOE if it can't
solve
the "white rabbit" problem. It will just have traded one problem for
another.
I think the remainder of your remarks equivocate on precisely this 3p-1p
distinction, so I won't comment on them specifically. If I've read you
wrongly on
this I'd be grateful for clarification.
No, I think that's a fair reading. As you note, I don't think it's
possible to have
a 1p-reduction of the 1p part (if I understand what you mean by
1p-reduction). I
think the engineering level solution may be the best that can be done.
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
email to
[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything
List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to
[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
