On 25 August 2014 08:43, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > > That's because Bruno rejects the link between 1) and 2) and takes > computation to exist in Platonia, independent of physics. So of course > with that assumption physics needs to either be explained from computation > (Bruno's program) or have it's own dualist basis. I'm not so sure Platonia > exists. Look up the old archive debates between Bruno and Peter Jones. >
If I understand Bruno's arguement correctly, that isn't an assumption, it's a deduction. He assumes physical and classical computation until he gets to the MGA, which apparently shows that we have to reject the assumption of physical computation, although I still don't really understand how (and all the talk of counterfactuals hasn't helped, as yet, unfortunately). The whole comp programme may of course be scuppered if consciousness requires quantum computation and the existence of a multiverse. Or it may not, since quantum computation (apparently) only speeds up classical computation. Alternatively, if a multiverse is necessary, then maybe that shows that consciousness is a larger phenomenon than is dreamt of, even in Bruno's philosophy, and we experience only a tiny sliver of it, at least in this universe? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
