On 8/24/2014 6:21 PM, LizR wrote:
On 25 August 2014 08:43, meekerdb <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
wrote:
That's because Bruno rejects the link between 1) and 2) and takes
computation to
exist in Platonia, independent of physics. So of course with that
assumption
physics needs to either be explained from computation (Bruno's program) or
have it's
own dualist basis. I'm not so sure Platonia exists. Look up the old
archive
debates between Bruno and Peter Jones.
If I understand Bruno's arguement correctly, that isn't an assumption, it's a deduction.
He assumes physical and classical computation until he gets to the MGA, which apparently
shows that we have to reject the assumption of physical computation, although I still
don't really understand how (and all the talk of counterfactuals hasn't helped, as yet,
unfortunately).
The whole comp programme may of course be scuppered if consciousness requires quantum
computation and the existence of a multiverse. Or it may not, since quantum computation
(apparently) only speeds up classical computation. Alternatively, if a multiverse is
necessary, then maybe that shows that consciousness is a larger phenomenon than is
dreamt of, even in Bruno's philosophy, and we experience only a tiny sliver of it, at
least in this universe?
I think the idea is that quantum randomness is just first-person-indeterminancy relative
to the universes of the multiverse. The holographic principle would imply that the
information content of any universe is always finite. If there are infinitely many
universes (per eternal inflation) then there would be infinitely many copies of distinct
universe. Or invoking Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles there would be finitely many
distinct universes, but the number of those that are expanding would increase without
bound. So that would all be consistent with "comp".
Brent
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