One more letter would do it. Brem and Brum. On 17 September 2014 08:59, John Mikes <[email protected]> wrote:
> Dear Bruno, > although I donot want to participate in the discussion of Russel's paper, > may I pick out a Brent(?) par : > >> >> >> >> *(BrM)...I don't understand. How is having DNA relevant to >> havingconsciousness? It is quite plausible that non-DNA-based forms >> areconscious (eg a computer running a suitable AI program), and thatsome >> DNA-based forms are not conscious (trees, for example)....* > > and your remark to that: > (BrM) *I agree.* > > Let me apply MY agnosticism in the questions and ask: HOW MUCH do we know > - indeed - about DNA and it's functions? We represent them by a formula of > symbols (atomic signs?) and assign whatever is coming up as their function > strictly as molecular portions. We have no idea what ELSE is involved > BEHIND those symbols assigning changes transpiring into our assumptions > (what most of us like to call "consciousness"). There may be lots of > unknowable facets, relations, trends, forces(?) and whatever beyond our > model of our reductionist sciences. Relations (of unknowable qualia) we > cannot even anticipate. > And - that a tree CANNOT have consciousness? Well, not a human one. But > the animal kingdom has different ones as well, especially the insects > (ants, bees?) > who's collective(?) Ccness we so far could not penetrate. Trees (plants) > react > to events (cf: my definition of Ccness: to RESPOND to relations) and so do > we, the other animals, insects, microbes and who knows what else > (stones-fluids)? > And we have "beneficial(??)" deals (Mitch) with microbes in our gut and > the symbiotic ones built into our organs (sometimes not-so-beneficial, but > who is to say?) > Please forgive my BrM for both Brent and yourself. > > > On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 12:21 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Hi Russell, Hi Others, >> >> Sorry for the delay. Some comments on your (Russell) MGA paper appear >> below. >> >> >> On 25 Aug 2014, at 00:30, Russell Standish wrote: >> >> On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 01:22:51PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: >>> >>>> On 8/24/2014 12:55 AM, Russell Standish wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>>> I don't think that can be the case. I don't see how it can be >>>>> anything >>>>> to be like a tree, yet trees are clearly DNA-based beings. So you >>>>> would get skewed results if you were to reason as though you could be >>>>> a tree. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Exactly. It's a reductio on the pattern of argument you used to >>>> prove ants can't be conscious. I used it to prove ants can't be DNA >>>> based. >>>> >>> >>> I don't understand. How is having DNA relevant to having >>> consciousness? It is quite plausible that non-DNA-based forms are >>> conscious (eg a computer running a suitable AI program), and that >>> some DNA-based forms are not conscious (trees, for example). >>> >> >> >> I agree. >> >> Incidentally, when you see the complexity of the interaction between the >> roots of trees and the soils, chemicals and through bacteria, and when you >> believe, as some experiences suggest, that trees and plant communicate, I >> am not so sure if trees and forest, perhaps on different time scale, have >> not some awareness, and a self-awareness of some sort. (I take awareness >> as synonymous with consciousness, although I change my mind below!). >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>>> >>>>> The reference class cannot be larger than the class of conscious >>>>> beings. Obviously it can be quite a bit smaller, but there must be a >>>>> maximal reference class for which anthropic reasoning is valid, >>>>> although it is quite controversial what it is - some suggest it may >>>>> even be as small as those people capable of understanding the >>>>> anthropic argument, a sizable fraction of which inhabits this list! >>>>> >>>> >>>> That's what bothers me. If you exclude ants because they're not >>>> conscious (and I assume you've read "Godel, Escher, and Bach") and >>>> hence can't understand the argument, why not exclude people who >>>> can't understand the argument? >>>> >>>> >>> "Ant Fugue" is about the possibility that ant _colonies_ might be >>> conscious. My argument has nothing to say about ant colonies, even >>> though I consider "Ant Fugue" to be just an interesting speculation, >>> rather than a serious claim about ant colonies. >>> >> >> >> I am a bit agnostic on this. But I have few doubt that individual ants >> have some consciousness, though. >> >> >> >> >>> Oh - perhaps you mean "can't understand the argument" as in organisms >>> that can't understand the anthropic argument must be excluded from the >>> reference class. This seems a rather implausible claim - just because >>> anthropic argument has not occurred to you yet, shouldn't really >>> exclude you. The idea that self-awareness is a necessary requirement >>> of the reference class is a perhaps more believable claim - in order to >>> even >>> think anthropically requires a concept of self - but then I'm still >>> not sure what it even means to be conscious, but not self-aware. What >>> does it even mean to "be an amoeba", as Bruno seems to think is possible. >>> >> >> >> OK. I will make a try. Awareness in its most basic forms comes from the >> ability to distinguish a good feeling from a bad feeling. The amoeba, like >> us, knows (in a weak sense) that eating some paramecium is good, but that >> hot or to cold place are bad, and this makes it reacts accordingly with >> some high degrees of relative self-referential correctness. The genome of >> the amoeba, which is really a collection of cooperating many genomes (lot >> of "nucleus") is Turing universal or "complete", and the amoeba incarnates >> it relatively to her (our) probable lower substitution level (which defines >> by the FPI the physical reality). So she get a life, a first person life, >> of some sorts. Little consciousness, if you want, because from the first >> person view of the amoeba it is the whole big thing. The life of protozoans >> are similar to ours. They keep moving for eating, try to avoid the possible >> predators, get sleepy (very deeply so) when it get cold (the cell >> transforms into a sort of egg), and they really dislike when being eaten, >> and try to avoid it instinctively, but with a possible "bad" experience. >> here an amoeba eats two paramecia: https://www.youtube.com/watch? >> v=pvOz4V699gk >> >> Now, amoeba are universal, but not Löbian, and so they lack the Kp -> KKp >> law, and are not self-aware. Nor do have them memories, or only few one, so >> they live in the instant present, happy when eating, unhappy when being >> eaten. At least they will not philosophize and be unhappy when eating >> because they know they *might* be eaten, nor happy when being eaten because >> they got the point that it is part of the game of life and be serene about >> this, or because they believe in christ or someone. You need to be Löbian >> to develop those form of craziness. I think this came with lower >> invertebrate, like jumping spiders and cuttlefishes. But they are lucky, >> their brain are not enough big to develop much of the craziness. They >> probably live a little bit less in the present, but still don't get the >> point of the existential question. >> >> To be aware is to feel the cold, the hot, the yummy, the acidity level, >> and capable of interpreting it "self-referentially", and reacting. >> >> To be self-aware add the memories and one more reflexive loop (which you >> get in RA when adding the induction axioms, leading to PA). As long as you >> are correct, you obey the modal logic G and G* in that case. But the 1p >> views obeys the intensional variants. >> >> >>> >>> >>> But that smacks of parochialism, much like the notion of >>>>> geocentrism. I just haven't found a convincing argument that the >>>>> maximal reference class is not just the class of conscious organisms, >>>>> of beings for whom there is a something it is like to be. >>>>> >>>>> But my question (which you haven't answered) is what you think this >>>>> maximal reference class is from your four part classification of >>>>> consciousness. >>>>> >>>> >>>> If I had to pick, I'd say it was those entities who were aware of >>>> their own thoughts and had sufficient language to formulate Bayesian >>>> inference. >>>> >>>> >>> The Bayesian theory is a bit stringent don't you think. There are >>> plenty of formulations of the doomsday argument that don't use >>> Bayesian reasoning. Take Gott's version for example. >>> >>> Self-awareness, as I mentioned, is more defensible property. The >>> question is whether non-self-aware consciousness (your koi) is a >>> coherent concept. >>> >> >> I agree that to have awareness, you need a self, a third person self. But >> that is well played by the relative body (actually bodies, incarnate >> through the UD). >> >> Maybe we should define consciousness by self-awareness, and then >> self-consciousness would be the higher form of self-self-awareness? That >> makes one "self" per reflexive loop. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Attacks on anthropic reasoning will work better by choosing a >>> reference class which is indisputably a subset of the reference class, >>> such as all human beings, and then demonstrating a contradiction. I >>> thought I had come up with such an example with my "Chinese paradox", >>> but it turned out anthropic reasoning was rescued from that by the >>> peculiar distribution of country population sizes that happens to hold >>> in reality. AR has proved remakably resilient to empirical tests. >>> >> >> I am still a bit agnostic for its use in the fundamentals, as the >> probability, with computationalism, are always relative. It is the same in >> quantum mechanics, where the probabilities are not on states, but on >> relative states: they have always the form <a I b>^2, the probability for >> finding b when being in the state a. >> But we can extract useful information from the Anthropic principle, and >> even from the most general Turing-thropic. Just saying that the laws of >> physics should be a calculus of relative probabilities. >> >> >> PS I have printed your MGA paper, and so read it and comment it despite >> being in a busy period. >> >> Let me say here, as we are in the good thread, two main points, where we >> might have vocabulary issue, or perhaps disagree on something? So you might >> think about this and be prepared :) >> >> The first point concerns the relation between counterfactualness and >> modal realism, that you link in a way which makes me a bit uneasy. I do >> believe in some links between them, though, but it might not correspond to >> yours. Examples will follow later. >> >> The second point is the one we have already discussed, and concerns the >> definition of supervenience. We do both agree on the Stanford definition, >> but I am still thinking you are misusing it when apply to the Alice and Bob >> in the classroom situation. >> >> You agree that >> C supervenes on B if to change C it is necessary to change B. >> For example, consciousness C supervenes on a brain activity B, because to >> change that consciousness you need to change that brain activity. >> >> Now take the (physical) union of B and A: B-and-A. >> If you change B, you automatically change B-and-A. >> >> So if consciousness C supervenes on B, you need to make a change to >> B-and-A (indeed to the B part), and so automatically C will supervenes on >> the union of B and A. >> >> So when Alice and Bob are in the classroom, we have that >> >> - Alice's consciousness supervenes on Alice's brain activity >> - Alice's consciousness supervenes on Alice + the entire room (including >> Bob's brain activity) >> - Bob consciousness supervenes on Bob's brain activity. >> - Bob consciousness supervenes on Bob + the entire room (including >> Alice's brain activity). >> >> It is not a problem that both Bob's and Alice's consciousness supervenes >> on the same classroom, as to make a change in either Alice or Bob's >> consciousness, you need to make a change of the A+B system. >> >> It is the same for UD*. My and your consciousness supervenes on UD*. To >> make a change to my or your's consciousness here and now, we would need to >> make the (impossible) change in the UD*. >> >> Are you OK with: >> >> (C supervenes on B) entails (C supervenes on B+D), with B+D being some >> physical union of B and some C. >> >> >> I have to go, sorry for the delays, and possible other delays. >> September-october are particularly heavy this year, but we have all the >> time, OK? >> >> Best, >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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