On 25 Sep 2014, at 01:18, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 04:47:08PM +0200, Platonist Guitar Cowboy
wrote:
On Wed, Sep 24, 2014 at 6:53 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 9/23/2014 5:23 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
Which I don't see. In both cases it would appear that one needs to
keep
matter primitive, which comp along UDA and machine interview lines
does
not, gradually letting go of it in steps 6,7,8.
I don't see why with comp specified we'd need some primitive
matter, which
you appear to assume ("matter organized certain ways...
consciousness
supervenes" )nor do I see convincing attempt of wrestling with
"matter is
any snot I need it to be for argument's sake".
Where I agree with you is that the subject is a mess; where I
perhaps
disagree is that I'm not sure you're part of the cleanup crew,
especially
with the vague matter you appear to be shlepping around. Could you
clarify
this? PGC
I agree with Russell, matter organized in certain ways is
necessary for
consciousness (as we know it. For *not* as we know it...well, we
don't know).
However, neither Russell nor I said "primitive" matter. That was
inserted
by you - thus muddling the muddle of which you complain.
It is implied by Russell's statement "materialism is perfectly
compatible
with comp", which I still don't see. "Organized in certain ways"
denotes
function of some sort, so one appears to need platonia, machines/
notion of
function with Russell's version of "comp"... while consciousness
supervenes
on matter is pulled out of the hat, which I would like explained as
we seem
to have left the comp frame Russell is asserting we are still in.
Materialism just means consciousness supervenes on matter. This is
Chalmers' definition, and is how I use the word. We've been over this
many times - the UDA does not rule out physical supervenience. If it
did, it would be so much the worse for COMP.
I see what you mean. It might not help much, because most materialist
are weak materialist: they do believe in a primary physical or
material world. So I usually link materialism and physicalism.
It is due to the aristotelian prejudice to call materialism "believes
in only matter, and then consciousness emerges or supervenes on
matter, or is associated to matter activity, etc.".
To say that consciousness supervene on matter is really ambiguous and
has a different meaning for people seing the computationalist reversal
and those who don't, I think, and believe, often unconsciously in some
primary "space-time-matter-energy-wave-matrix". What computationalism
enforces us to so is to extract that physical matrix from that
consciousness invariance fro the digital permutation of realities
below our substitution level.
What the UDA does rule out is physicalism, the notion that the
physical
reality is all there is.
Bruno's "primitive matter" is just physicalism. Some people seem to
conflate materialism with physicalism - Michael Lockwood is one, for
instance, but I'd prefer to distinguish them like Chalmers does.
The MGA does drive a contradictio between physical supervenience and
COMP, but the point of my paper which started this thread is that the
MGA only works in a non-robust universe.
?
Thus COMP is perfectly
compatible with materialism in a robust universe.
But in a robust universe, already by UDA1-7, physics is reduced to the
sigma_1 statistics.
Then by Occam razor we don't need to assume anything more than the
sigma_1 truth, that is a quite tiny fragment of arithmetic.
Of course we must compare, and once we find a difference, we know that
comp has to be abandoned, or we are in an emulation controlled by
other self-are creature, or I dream, etc.
"Perfectly compatible" I'd like to see, and what role matter plays as
apparently "platonically malleable" urstuff on par with its
"organization",
without flight into the transparent "everything is everything"
position,
for which we always can use cleanup crews.
Matter is most definitely not '"platonically malleable" urstuff'. That
is not what is meant by conscious supervenes on matter. Again - see my
paper for the explanation.
I'd like to see this clarified, and indeed if this clarifies
anything...
letting matter organized by Plato into the thing means infinities of
primitives (this permits matter to be organized in infinite ways),
without
clarifying why this is needed or what it clarifies about properties
of
matter. Unless there is some insight into matter from which say
"organization" can be explained for example. So the muddle ball is
back
your court with Russell. PGC
The only "muddle" I see is the conflation of materialism and
physicalism. It doesn't help that Bruno uses MAT to describe both
positions in his thesis, but we have clarified that point a number of
times.
We agree, but after the reversal "materialism" has not the same
meaning than before the reversal, and I agree with your use, as it is
coherent with comp, but it can be misleading for those who miss it, or
does not really take into account.
With comp, consciousness supervenes on matter, but still accidentally
so, and in virtue that some 1p-winning computations are Turing complete.
Matter is not well defined, but nor is the notion of "physical
reality", so I think that, given the number of aristotelians, to not
add nuances, forced by the main comprehension that physicalism
(naturalism, and materialism in the current sense) meet difficulties
(to be diplomat) with the assumption that our bodies (3)-self) are
Turing emulable.
Just a vocabulary problem, of course.
Bruno
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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected]
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret
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