On Tue, Sep 30, 2014 at 2:19 AM, Russell Standish <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 29, 2014 at 06:45:51PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > On 29 Sep 2014, at 02:22, Russell Standish wrote: > > > > > > > >I introduced the term "urstuff" as a way of referring to what is > > >ontologically real. "primitive urstuff" is a tautology, of course, as > > >urstuff is primitive by definition. > I have already patent on "platonically malleable urstuff". So don't go introducing my stuff any further. > > > > > >Urstuff could be matter, or it could be a platonic system like the > > >integers. Since we can never know what it is, we should Wittgensteinly > > >shut our traps about it, but since we don't seem to be able to do > > >that, we need a label to talk about it. > What's wrong with the usual "primitive objects/entities" in some theory/ontology etc? > > > > > > But stuff is so much connotated to matter. Matter seems even more > > abstract than stuff. Some people makes the error that physics > > Only in my grandmother's English. She would say stuff is material - ie > specifically the fabric that you make clothes, or curtains out of. But > already by my generation, "stuff" is roughly synonymous with > "things". A thing needn't be material. My son's generation, would > probably use the word "junk" in the same way. > ...and in some rather particular other ways as well. > > > becomes arithmetic, which is against comp, where physics is a > > modality of observation (the FPI bet "one" obeys the quantum logic > > S4Grz1, or Z1*). > > > > Again, this is just vocabulary, but to say that numbers are stuff > > seems to me to easily lead to the error of confusing math and > > physics (which some people do when using comp naively). > > > > I don't think so. But in any case, I'm using a new word "urstuff", > which is definitely not my grandmother's "stuff". > Yes, it's my stuff. > > > I think that insisting that number are not physical, not stuffy, not > > material, we are closer to your "nothing" intuition, given this > > makes clear that there is nothing physical, except in the internal > > self-emerging semantic in arithmetic, on arithmetic. > > > > In English, "stuffy" refers to a personality type - someone who is > rigid and formal might be called "stuffy". You're the only person I > know of using it as an adjective meaning "made of matter". > Mass, heaviness. A stuffy person isn't erm... light or easy. > > You do have an important point that the ontological number base is not > the same as the empirical world, a distinction captured by Kant's > noumenon-phenomenon dichotomy. Here you speak in absolute terms... But I can see how in comp numbers and the like become "stuff/entity" by definition and rules of the game, in similar way as matter in appropriate contexts. > With the FPI discovery, you can > demonstrate this quite formally. But to insist that number aren't > physical up front probably doesn't help, as most people don't have a > good idea what physical is to start with. With your reversal result, > and insisting that physical means what is observed as phenomena, you > can then conclude that the arithmetical reality is not phenomena. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > >>> > > >>>It demonstrates an inconsistency between physical supervenience and > > >>>computational supervenience, notably that physical supervenience > > >>>entails that certain very simple computations, such as the replaying > > >>>of a recording, will be conscious. > > >>> > > >>>This only works in a non-robust universe, however, a point that is > > >>>often overlooked in treatments of this. > > >> > > >> > > >>It seems to me that the MGA makes the robust/non-robustness > > >>irrelevant. It is enough that elementary arithmetic, or the > > >>combinators, is a robust reality. > > >> > > > > > >I agree. The whole non-robust universe move is a rejection of your AR > > >postulate. But it does seem reasonable to ask what might happen if not > > >all possible programs could exist, ie that the Turing model of > > >computation is constrained in some way. I guess essential if you > > >really want to tackle Aristotelianism in its home ground. > > > > I mention the sub-universal more often called sub-creative) set of > > computable function. That might be interesting indeed. But if we > > assume the usual computationalist assumption, for theology and > > physics, introuicing such a restriction would already be like doing > > terachery. If such a restriction plays a role (as I am sure it > > does), that has to be extracted from self-reference to exploit the > > G/G* distinction, and get both qualia and quanta. > > > > > > > > > > > > > >>The ultrafinitist physicalism has still to endow his "existing > > >>matter" with magical non-Turing emulable to make its reality doing > > >>the selection it seems to me. > > >> > > > > > >I agree it is non-Turing, but magical might be a bit too strong an > > >epithet. The argument, presumably, is that some computations require > > >too great a resource in order to be instantiated. (By analogy with > > >Norm Wildberger's main argument against infinity). > > > > > > > > > Comp does not allow infinity in its basic ontology. All of 0, 1, 2, > > 3, ... are finite. > That's weird because of "..." as pointer to infinite. > [0, 1, 2, 3, ...} is already in the mind of some > > machines, like ZF. It shorten the proofs, and enlighten the picture > > from inside. Comp, as Judson Webb analyse it, is a finitism. > His book is too expensive so have to go to library (hint: anybody with pdf?) > > is Norm Wildberger an utltrafinitist in math? He look like a > > materialist, and ultrafinitist in physics, but normally that is what > > the MGA shows it can't really work (unless adding the "magic > > "needed). That magic is more than non Turing emulable, it is also > > not FPI recoverable. I have no idea what that could be except as > > something incomprehensible (primitive matter) introduced to make > > something else (machine's mind) incomprehensible. > > > > I haven't chatted with Norm personally about this - his views have > evolved considerably in the years since I was regularly in the > department. All I know is what he presented in that seminar, and also > what was written in that New Scientist article. > > ISTM that that the MGA presents choices: > > 1) COMP is false > 2) Physical supervenience is false (that's hard to square with > evidence) > Especially when considering that comp assumption, as far as I can tell, emphasizes theology of machines bearing on this question, i.e. what it considers evidence. > 3) We live in a robust reality (such as AR) > Still don't get relation between comp and resolution of finite, infinite controversy; especially given "..." attribute today of supposedly finite comp. And I'm going to stay quite obtuse (at least [image: \aleph_0]-obtuse, if I have to quantify) on this so bring it on, either way. > 4) Some recordings are conscious > Not from 3p, which drives MGA I'd say. PGC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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