On 05 Dec 2014, at 08:06, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/4/2014 8:05 PM, LizR wrote:
I suspect that Bruno is differentiating physical existence from
primary existence.
What's the difference? Isn't physical existence the paradigmatic
case? the example we point to when asked to define "exits"?
Physical existence is the natural way to look at things. It is better
for the physical survival of the animals. But we cannot extrapolate
this in the metaphysical or theological. If we do, it means that we
choose the theology of Aristotle, which is nice, and
"paradigmatic" ... since Aristotle. yet science (including theology)
is born from taking some distance with the identification of "real"
and observable.
The fact is that there are two strong evidences that Aristotelian
ontology cannot work for the fundamental questioning.
1) it does not work with the computationalist hypothesis (by UDA, the
physical is redefined by the observable or invariant for self-
multiplication/differentiation in the arithmetical reality)
2) as (retro)explained by "1)", the quantum facts, where the existence
of an object is also provided by a measure on (quantum) computations
(a measure which exists and has a unique shape thanks to Gleason
theorem).
We still lack the equivalent of Gleason theorem in arithmetic. It is
obviously a difficult math problem.
Bruno
Brent
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