Same here, just one box. The paradox hinges on clairvoyance and how we could expect that to be sensible in the universe we live in. To my way of thinking, clairvoyance entails a sort of backwards-causation which I think can be made sensible in a multiverse. To wit, you make your choice (one box, say), and that "collapses" the possible universes you are in to the one in which the clairvoyant predicted you would choose one box, and so you get the money.
In other words, the justification for choosing both boxes - that the contents of the boxes have already been determined - fails to provide an account of clairvoyance that can be made sensible. Or rather, I just can't think of one. Terren On Wed, Dec 10, 2014 at 5:13 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 10 Dec 2014, at 09:55, Jason Resch wrote: > > I started quite a lively debate at work recently by bringing up Newcomb's > Paradox. We debated topics ranging from the prisoner's dilemma to the > halting problem, from free will to retro causality, from first person > indeterminacy to Godel's incompleteness. > > My colleagues were about evenly split between one-boxing and two-boxing, > and I was curious if there would be any more consensus among the members of > this list. If you're unfamiliar with the problem there are descriptions > here: > > http://www.philosophyexperiments.com/newcomb/ > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newcomb%27s_paradox > > If you reach a decision, please reply with whether your strategy would be > to take one box or two, what assumptions you make, and why you think your > strategy is best. I don't want to bias the results so I'll provide my > answer in a follow-up post. > > > I take only one box. Non randomly! I use my free-will ... > To be sure and make thing simpler, I assume the predictor is 100% accurate. > > Bruno > > > > > Jason > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
