What if its not a clairvoyant but a super intelligent alien with an accuracy of 99.9999% does that change your answer?
What if it is a human psychologist with an accuracy of 80%? One of my friends said if it was 100% he would one-box, but if it was even slightly below 100% he would take two boxes. Jason On Wed, Dec 10, 2014 at 10:36 AM, Terren Suydam <[email protected]> wrote: > Same here, just one box. The paradox hinges on clairvoyance and how we > could expect that to be sensible in the universe we live in. To my way of > thinking, clairvoyance entails a sort of backwards-causation which I think > can be made sensible in a multiverse. To wit, you make your choice (one > box, say), and that "collapses" the possible universes you are in to the > one in which the clairvoyant predicted you would choose one box, and so you > get the money. > > In other words, the justification for choosing both boxes - that the > contents of the boxes have already been determined - fails to provide an > account of clairvoyance that can be made sensible. Or rather, I just can't > think of one. > > Terren > > On Wed, Dec 10, 2014 at 5:13 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 10 Dec 2014, at 09:55, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> I started quite a lively debate at work recently by bringing up Newcomb's >> Paradox. We debated topics ranging from the prisoner's dilemma to the >> halting problem, from free will to retro causality, from first person >> indeterminacy to Godel's incompleteness. >> >> My colleagues were about evenly split between one-boxing and two-boxing, >> and I was curious if there would be any more consensus among the members of >> this list. If you're unfamiliar with the problem there are descriptions >> here: >> >> http://www.philosophyexperiments.com/newcomb/ >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newcomb%27s_paradox >> >> If you reach a decision, please reply with whether your strategy would be >> to take one box or two, what assumptions you make, and why you think your >> strategy is best. I don't want to bias the results so I'll provide my >> answer in a follow-up post. >> >> >> I take only one box. Non randomly! I use my free-will ... >> To be sure and make thing simpler, I assume the predictor is 100% >> accurate. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> Jason >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
