I would say if his predictions are better than 50% accuracy, I would go for one box... But I would still need a proof that they effectively are... and maybe also an explanation of how the predictions are made...
Regards, Quentin 2014-12-10 17:48 GMT+01:00 Jason Resch <[email protected]>: > What if its not a clairvoyant but a super intelligent alien with an > accuracy of 99.9999% does that change your answer? > > What if it is a human psychologist with an accuracy of 80%? > > One of my friends said if it was 100% he would one-box, but if it was even > slightly below 100% he would take two boxes. > > Jason > > > On Wed, Dec 10, 2014 at 10:36 AM, Terren Suydam <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Same here, just one box. The paradox hinges on clairvoyance and how we >> could expect that to be sensible in the universe we live in. To my way of >> thinking, clairvoyance entails a sort of backwards-causation which I think >> can be made sensible in a multiverse. To wit, you make your choice (one >> box, say), and that "collapses" the possible universes you are in to the >> one in which the clairvoyant predicted you would choose one box, and so you >> get the money. >> >> In other words, the justification for choosing both boxes - that the >> contents of the boxes have already been determined - fails to provide an >> account of clairvoyance that can be made sensible. Or rather, I just can't >> think of one. >> >> Terren >> >> On Wed, Dec 10, 2014 at 5:13 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 10 Dec 2014, at 09:55, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> I started quite a lively debate at work recently by bringing up >>> Newcomb's Paradox. We debated topics ranging from the prisoner's dilemma to >>> the halting problem, from free will to retro causality, from first person >>> indeterminacy to Godel's incompleteness. >>> >>> My colleagues were about evenly split between one-boxing and two-boxing, >>> and I was curious if there would be any more consensus among the members of >>> this list. If you're unfamiliar with the problem there are descriptions >>> here: >>> >>> http://www.philosophyexperiments.com/newcomb/ >>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newcomb%27s_paradox >>> >>> If you reach a decision, please reply with whether your strategy would >>> be to take one box or two, what assumptions you make, and why you think >>> your strategy is best. I don't want to bias the results so I'll provide my >>> answer in a follow-up post. >>> >>> >>> I take only one box. Non randomly! I use my free-will ... >>> To be sure and make thing simpler, I assume the predictor is 100% >>> accurate. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Jason >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
