On 04 Jan 2015, at 01:51, meekerdb wrote:

On 1/3/2015 9:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 03 Jan 2015, at 06:28, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List wrote:



From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com ] On Behalf Of Kim Jones
Sent: Wednesday, December 31, 2014 8:55 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: "Animals think like autistic humans"




On 1 Jan 2015, at 2:52 pm, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List <everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:



From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com ] On Behalf Of meekerdb
Sent: Wednesday, December 31, 2014 4:30 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: "Animals think like autistic humans"

On 12/31/2014 4:00 PM, Kim Jones wrote:


>>You seem to be saying that we can do nothing new about thinking.
No, not that at all. I am saying that first we need to understand what thinking really is and move beyond our primitive anthropocentric views that have come to us from our past. We have a long heritage of thinking about what thinking is, so lots of material to draw from. The more humbly we come to understand that our self-aware inner dialogue is the mind’s (simplified and summarized) narration of a deeper and much vaster non verbalized intelligence which is that which is doing the individuals *thinking*

OK, but then you can't stop the descend and you will need to say that the thinking is done by the arithmetical realizations, but that is 3p descriptible (even if infinite) so something has gone wrong (we get trapped in a cinfusion between the 3p, []p, and the 1p, []p &p).

What's wrong with being 3p describable (aside from mystic prejudices)?

It is usually accepted by philosophers of mind, theologian, poet, and most people capable of some aount of introspection, that experiences, consciousness, qualia, pain, etc. are not 3p describable. It is a chance for mechanism, as most arithmetical truth a machine can be confronted to by introspection are not 3p describable. For example the "classical" knower, []p & p, if it can be defined for each arithmetical proposition p, cannot be defined by a predicate in arithmetic knowable('p'), (for reason similar that True('p') cannot be defined). This has been shown by Scott and Montague. Despite being not definable by a machine, a machine can still reason on it and find that it obeys a precise mathematics (with the propositional part obeying the modal logic S4Grz).

Bruno




Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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