On 19 Jan 2015, at 08:24, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/18/2015 9:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Jan 18, 2015 at 9:34 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 1/18/2015 7:00 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Jan 18, 2015 at 6:26 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 1/15/2015 6:35 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Jan 15, 2015 at 6:01 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
How would you define "intelligence" for this thing?
Jupiter Brain / Omega Point / Result of post-singularity
intelligence explosion / Platonic mind with access infinite
computing resources / Dyson's sphere powered computer, take your
pick. It's capable enough to run a planet-wide simulation down to
whatever necessary detail it desires, and be able to infer any
being's thoughts on the planet by analyzing its brain activity.
Beyond that I'm not sure how to quantify or define its
intelligence.
I think of intelligence as the ability to observe and infer and
learn. Of course the traditional God was not only the creator of
everything He was also a person who knew everything and so could
not learn anything.
Maybe this one is only a mere demi-god then. You can only say it
knows everything about its simulation.
1. Would you consider such a demi-god a theistic god for the
entities within its simulation?
Not necessarily. One of the defining characteristics of the
theist God is that He cares about human behavior (especially when
they're nude).
If I understand you correctly, you're saying that even if it were
demonstrated that our universe was created and is maintained by a
theistic God simulating the whole universe, you would not call it
a theistic God unless it happened to care about your behavior when
you're nude? You will go to any stretch to avoid entertaining the
possibility that atheism might be wrong.
There's already a word for the religion that says a god creates and
runs things but doesn't much care about human behavior; it's called
deism and deists, like Thomas Jefferson, were commonly called
atheists by their political opponents.
I don't understand your complaint about avoiding disproof of
atheism. I have given a fairly specific definition of it which
easily admits of empirical refutation. Yaweh could show up
tomorrow. It's not my fault if theism is false. You're the one
that wants to fuzz out theism to mean almost anything except
reductive materialism.
2. Can you rule out that some demi-god somewhere isn't simulating
this planet?
No.
I take back my last sentence.
3. Do you think the existence of such a demi-god follows from the
UDA/arithmetical realism?
Probably not. But in any case I'm not a fan of arithmetical
realism. Truth =/= existence.
You're right it doesn't. But the truth of the statement "There
exists a program X that computes Y" is proof of the existence of
program X which computes Y.
But "existence" only in the mathematical sense which is
tautological; i.e. implicit in some axioms,
Then all theories are tautological.
which you've left unstated in your example, relying on common
assumption of the Church-Turing thesis to define "computes".
And relying on the "multiple realizability" implication of
computationalism, it shouldn't matter what the substrate is for the
computed minds, be it neurons, silicon, electrons and quarks, or
platonic objects. So the "mathematical existence" of something, can
be and feel just as real to the computed minds within
that mathematical reality, as the world would feel to
the mind existing in a physical reality.
So there's no difference between simulated and fundamental reality?
And there's no difference between physical reality and mathematical
reality (Tegmarkism).
Which is wrong. mathematicians have is a quite different subject of
study, different from the physicists.
Nox with comp, the physical reality becomes in part a study in math
(and in theology or psychology), but this reduction does not identify
physics with mathematics.
This is utterly clear in the arithmetical translation of the UDA,
where the basic ontology is arithmetical reality, with this "ExP(x°"
always meaning that there is some n = s(s(s...(s(s(s0))...)))) such
that P(n) is true in the usual structure, and physical existence is
defined by []<>Ex([]<> P( ... x ...).
I have more doubt for physical reality than the mathematical
reality, however.
How can that be when you've said you think they are the same thing?
I don't think jason ever said that. The physical is about the
measurement of real numbers that we can share through publications.
The mathematical is about all real numbers (and others) relations, not
necessarily correlated with what we can measure.
Nor is the physical a particular mathematical structure among all
mathematical structures. With computationalism, the physical is a
special psycho-theo-logical experiences by the soul canonically
attached to numbers relatively to universal numbers. It is more a
special phenomenon related to many mathematical structures than a
special mathematical structure.
Bruno
Brent
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