On 21 Jan 2015, at 01:27, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/20/2015 9:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The only problem with using god for definition of god (large or
small) is that it's circular. You repeatedly write things like
above, "My belief in God is trivial. All machine introspecting are
confronted to it, and from outside, in the metatheory, we can see
that they can confused it (correctly, or not) with truth." Where
God is "it", but there is no definition. The closest I've seen to
you defining your god is "the unprovable truths of an axiomatic
system" or "the fundamental basis of all being". The former is
former is fairly clear and I can see how a self-referential system
could "confront it". The latter may be a description without a
referent and I don't see why a self-referential system would
necessarily "confront it".
This is explained by the fact that, as Gödel already knew, machines
can prove their own incompleteness. Thay can intuit and infer a
notion of truth from the fact that they can prove <>t -> ~[]<>t,
and actually inferred, from their tries here and now that
they can't prove their consistency, and thus bet on ~[]<>t, and
eventually bet on <>t as the simplest explanation of why they
cannot prove <>t. So they can develop an intuition of truth, and
undersatnd that they cannot define it, and that there are many true
propositions that they cannot justify rationally, etc.
Suppose they prove (which is likely true of all humans) that they
are inconsistent, on some point, but avoid ex falso quodlibet?
To extract the computationalist correct physics from the machine
interview, we need only to interview ideally correct machine.
We can add later a non monotonical layer of provability with a notion
of revising belief, and indeed the correct machine has it by
incompleteness, but just never exploit it, which simplifies the task
of getting the comp-correct physics.
Bruno
Brent
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