On 25 Jan 2015, at 05:47, 'Roger' via Everything List wrote:
The starting question is this: are you OK with the idea that we
would not see any difference from our first person point of view
with an artificial digital brain (copying the brain at some level of
description). Putting him roughly: do you accept the idea that the
brain is a sort of (natural) machine/computer (like the heart is
accepted to be a natural pump)?
While many on this list seem to believe in it, not even
everyone here seems to buy into it. It's one idea among many. As
I've said many times, let's all work our models and see what
progress we can make.
All what I say is derived from the assumption that the brain or the
body is Turing emulable at a level such that if we turing-emulate
it, you would not see the difference subjectively. It is my working
assumption.
Roger: It's possible that what we see as existing is a simulation in
some other computer.
And thus in arithmetic, which can be proved to emulate all computers,
on all programs, on all input. This is standard knowledge for
logicians, but not always well known by non-logicians. It is crucial
when we assume computationalism. In particular the mere idea that
2+2=4 (and the like) entails the existence of all computations going
through you actual state (say), even as part of infinitely many
computations, all existing in the same sense that "prime numbers
exists".
In fact the result is that IF computationalism is correct THEN physics
is reduced to the calculus of the First Person Indeterminacy on all
computations (going through my actual state in case I want to make an
actual prediction).
The interesting question is: does this leads to unitary evolution like
it is suggested by the empirical experience?
This has been partially solved: the logic of the probability one (on
yes-no experiments) gives a quantum logic, and a quantization of
classical histories similar to the one suggested by the experience.
But, even if we are a simulation, the simulation that is us exists
as does the computer and the code we're a simulation in.
Yes. Not only they exist, but their existence can be proved in the
same sense that we can prove the existence of this or that prime number.
My thinking is aimed at trying to figure out there are existent
entities, whether we call them simulations, singular arithmetic
computations/propositions, or whatever, instead of there not being
existent entities.
Of course. That is the most interesting question. Hmm... You might be
disappointed.
It is logically impossible to explain or justify (prove) the existence
of something without assuming some things and some relation on those
things.
In fact, if you want your reality being Turing universal, you need to
assume a Turing universal system.
The full predicate classical logical calculus is not Turing universal.
Arithmetic with only addition leads already to a very rich and complex
mathematics, but is decidable and thus not Turing Universal. Same with
only multiplication.
But astonishingly enough addition + multiplication leads to Turing
universality.
Then the reasoning exploiting computationalism + computer science,
shows that physics (and theology) are machine or theory independent,
for the basic ontology.
I use the number, because people are familiar with them, but sometimes
I use combinateurs, or the phi_i formalism to help keeping in mind the
theory independence of both matter and mind.
Abstractly matter is a sort of derivative of the mind. Some like
results by Blok and Ysapia on some Cantor space semantic of G might be
used to make this more literal (the derivative *is* a leibnitzian
derivative, but the topology is not an hausdorffian topology.
I sum up often by a simple parody of Kronecker: God created the
natural numbers and said add and multiply, all the rest belongs to the
imagination of some numbers.
--------------------------
Roger: I can accept any idea including arithmetical reality as long
as there's more logic and evidence for it than for other ideas.
That's what I call being an agnostic. I haven't seen or read
anything here or elsewhere that has convinced me of arithmetical
reality as opposed to other ideas.
You add metaphysics where there is none. Did you go out of the
classroom at school when they mentioned the existence of the even
numbers, or of the prime numbers?
Roger :It's unclear to me how wanting logic and evidence (mostly
just evidence) for an idea is adding metaphysics.
My question was more about your belief that the following axioms makes
sense.
x + 0 = x
x + successor(y) = successor(x + y)
x * 0 = 0
x * successor(y) = x + (x * y)
OK?
We assume also:
0 is different from all successor(x)
successor(x) = successor(y) -> x = y
--------------------------
My assumption is that there is no magic operating in the brain.
Roger: I'd agree that there's no magic operating in the brain or
anywhere else.
The problem is that once you have a universal machine, from the
machine points of view, she is confronted to some magic, the
"infinities", notably, and then, it is the whole problem, with to much
magic, because arithmetic does contains very complex sets, and it is
not entirely clear how we can avoid them, especially in "near death",
or "near inconsitency" situations. But we know, with computationalism,
that "physics" *is* the solution of that problem: the relative measure
<states/computations> relationships.
--------------------------
My goal in my thinking is to try and figure out why there are
existent entities instead of no existent entities (e.g. the
"something" versus "nothing" question) and to use that thinking to
build a model of what the universe seems to look like and to
hopefully make testable predictions. Of course, I'm a long way
from that but am working on it. I've summarized my thinking at my
website and at this list. Overall, you don't believe in a primary
physical universe. That's great, and I'm happy for you. I do.
I have never say that I don't believe in a primary physical
universe. I am agnostic. All what I say is that IF computationalism
is correct, THEN there is no primary physical universe (playing any
role related to my consciousness, to be more precise (we still needs
some amount of Occam to get rid of it)).
So, if you assume a primitive physical universe (related to our
consciousness), then you derive from my argument that
computationalism is false. There is some actual infinities, and non
computable one, and non FPI recovrable one, playing in the brain.
But this seems using a string ontological commitment to avoid an
explanation. It is a bit like a creationist saying "I am OK that
natural selection explains a lot, but let us be clear, it completely
fails to explain how God made this in six days".
As always, we'll all take our thinking, work our models and see
what progress can be made. And, good luck to everyone!
Good luck to you too. Can you recall me you website?
Roger: I'm also agnostic on all of this. I lean towards the idea
that our universe is at its most fundamental level, composed of
physically existent entities and am building a model based on it,
but if someone can provide me with enough evidence that the
computationalism or any other idea is better, I'm willing to
switch. I just haven't seen that evidence here or elsewhere. For
me, I'd need evidence of why arithmetical propositions exist rather
than not exist in order to change my model. As many of us do, I
feel like I have a solution that makes sense to me for why there are
existent entities rather than there not being existent entities. I
base my thinking on this. A summary is at:
https://sites.google.com/site/whydoesanythingexist/
and a more detailed explanation along with more philosophical stuff
and a beginning model is at:
https://sites.google.com/site/ralphthewebsite/
(click on 3rd link down)
I will take a look. A participant of this list Peter Sas has made a
facebook page on that question "why is there something rather than
nothing".
While we are working on different models, it's been a great
discussion. Thanks.
Not sure we have different models.
I assume nothing but elementary arithmetic, Church-Thesis, and the
assumption that there is no magic in the brain. Computationalism is a
theological assumption: I can survive with a digital brain/body
"reincarnation". With Church thesis: this is equivalent with mechanism
(no magic).
I'm afraid that if you want keep up your assumption of the existence
of a primitive physical universe, you will need some amount of
"artificial magic", violating computationalism, to sustain a relation
between that primitive physical universe and your consciousness.
I don't know. I just show that it is amenable to mathematics, and that
it entails testable constraints on the physical appearances.
Truth is in your head, and truth is also in the head of all universal
entities.
That contains physics, if comp is true, so let us compare the
classical comp physics and the empiric one. I got some results and
many open problems. My point is that we can work on such problem with
the scientific attitude. The difficulty is that it uses mathematical
logic and theoretical computer science, which are not so well known. I
can give references, but it needs some works. The big start is the
discovery of the universal machine and of the Löbian theories or
machines, or RE sets, (by the logicians). The Löbian are universal
machines introspective enough to know that they are universal, in some
weak precise sense.
Bruno
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