On 17 Feb 2015, at 13:55, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
Very good. I do go computationalism myself, but in a weird way.
As long as you are valid, you can be as weird as you want.
I confer that everything we see is running on software, but the
software yields physical reality, perhaps as a side effect.
Hmm... Computationalism, as I define it, is that *you*, or what you
can count on you, is run by a software.
Then everything we live and see, including physics (if that exists),
is a side effect.
But then a priori physics and what we see cannot be Turing emulable.
The apparent emulability of nature is a problem for the
computationalists, but with computer science it becomes a
mathematically formulable problem.
The idea is very simple, once you are aware of some result in computer
science, notably the fact that once you agree that a tiny part of the
arithmetical reality, or any other computer-science theoretical
reality, is independent of you and me.
This is implicitly used in physics, through the use of mathematical
theories, usually richer than arithmetic, but this is debatable.
But that reality, conceptually much simpler than physics, or physics +
a creator, contains the experience you are living here and now. That
is a *fact*. All executions of all programs can be translated into an
infinity of purely arithmetical relations, that is the fact, but then,
once you assume computationalism, you can understand that your
consciousness is not related to this or that realization by this or
that universal numbers, but, below your substitution, results from the
statistics on a infinity of those arithmetical realizations of
programs execution.
An infinite or near infinite reality, whether you invoke MWI,
We can't a priori assume QM, but semantically and intuitively,
computationalism forces a similar move than Everett, but not on the
universal unitary transformation, just on the sigma_1 part of
arithmetic. The sigma_1 part is the computable part, it is the Turing
emulable part of the arithmetical reality, which extends considerably
in the non computable part.
By the FPI, we are undetermined on that collection of realizations. By
computer science, it has what is needed for an abstract measure,
hopefully with the right groups.
or subdomains within an infinite cosmos, would handle the energy
issue, quite well.
Energy is the constant 0. The nothing physical, which already emulate
largely the physical reality. But this is from observation, and with
computationalism (and the mind-body problem in mind) we need to derive
even this from the arithmetical mind-body problem.
But it works. Things have been done at the propositional level.
And thanks to incompleteness, the notion of truth acts like a notion
of God for the machine, which makes possible an interpretation of
Plotinus.
It just won't consume an infinite right here, in this universe or
domain. In fact, energy may just be software, in a level or reality
above us.
With comp you can start from the bottom, you assume only what you need
for defining your favorite universal reality, and you derive the laws
coupling minds and stable realities from mathematical logic, and
mathematics.
I use arithmetic because it is taught in high school.
The real debate is not on the existence of God, (which is rather
obvious), it is on the existence of the Physical Universe.
Is there a physical universe? Aristotle seems to have believe this.
Plato was open to the idea that the physical universe is only an
aspect of a simpler deeper reality, and some tradition have defended
the idea that the deeper reality might be arithmetical or
mathematical. Even in that case, computationnalism makes it impossible
to reduce the whole of truth to a 3p reality, so comp prevents even
the reduction in that part. It is the price of consistency (<>t).
Consciousness/conscience (<>t inference) accelerates the path toward
truth.
Alas,
Lies ([]f = ~<>t, or "worst" []<>t, can too. Delusions can help, but
you cut your link with the main deities <>t, G*, Z1*, X1*.
Here we are at the beginning, and I describe only the theology of the
correct, never lying machine. The theology of the liar is a much more
complex subject. Fortunately, it does not seems liars are required to
extract physics from arithmetic. It is less clear for the biological
evolution, where preys and predator can lie to each others.
Bruno
Once you bet on programs (computationalism) you belongs to
infinities of computations, and the appearance of the universe
emerges from a statistics on all computations. Bostrom participated
to this list but seems to not have yet taken into account the first
person indeterminacy (FPI). He and others told me at some meeting
that this what sort of taboo. A part of his argument can still be
saved, as indeed comp implies that we can test [Computationalism OR
we are in a purposeful simulation, with entities which consume an
infinite amount of energy to lie to us, as they must change our
minds each time we look at the details of the simulation].
Bruno
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
To: everything-list <[email protected]>
Sent: Mon, Feb 16, 2015 6:18 am
Subject: Re: Why is there something rather than nothing? From
quantum theory to dialectics?
On 16 Feb 2015, at 02:55, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
Interesting John. In steinharts view the first initiator of reality
may indeed not have been a super mind, except in power. Kind of
like gnosticism, maybe.
2+2=4 is enough. No need to add unnecessary metaphysics. This is not
controversial, although not well known by philosophers, logicians
know this since Gödel, Kleene, etc.
What is not trivial is that it leads to "new equation" for
fundamental physics (given by the FPI, translated in the intensional
variant of self-reference, making comp testable in some sense).
The succeeding universes and each cosm has a god will be
succeedingly better.
But this does not make sense. Universe are not things which exists
ontologically.
People get moved to better universes after croaking, akin to
processes getting pipelined as with software engineering. We would
be one on a gigantic processes, aka programs, aka cellular
automata, that are copied and then initiated later. As with
Bostrom, steinhart says that these programs, us, eventually begin
their own sim creations. I got this from steinharts other papers I
have been studying. So your critique of steinharts 1st mind or god,
would not find opposition with him, but it would suggest that
evolution (to me) must be a primary program. Thanks for your coment.
Once you bet on programs (computationalism) you belongs to
infinities of computations, and the appearance of the universe
emerges from a statistics on all computations. Bostrom participated
to this list but seems to not have yet taken into account the first
person indeterminacy (FPI). He and others told me at some meeting
that this what sort of taboo. A part of his argument can still be
saved, as indeed comp implies that we can test [Computationalism OR
we are in a purposeful simulation, with entities which consume an
infinite amount of energy to lie to us, as they must change our
minds each time we look at the details of the simulation].
Bruno
Mitch
Sent from AOL Mobile Mail
-----Original Message-----
From: John Clark <[email protected]>
To: everything-list <[email protected]>
Sent: Sun, Feb 15, 2015 12:16 PM
Subject: Re: Why is there something rather than nothing? From
quantum theory to dialectics?
On Sun, Feb 15, 2015 at 12:52 AM, spudboy100 via Everything List <[email protected]
> wrote:
> John, see if you can read this paper. Its a slideshow from Ars
Disputandi of an eric steinhart paper, on the theological
implications of the simulation argument. This is the only copy I
downloaded of the url, but I was able to do a download and print at
work so I have hard copy. Steinhart seems to be an atheist, but
believes there was a creator and now a system of creators above and
beyond us, etc. I guess steinhart might say, yeah thers a god, but
don't pray to him. If you can read this, please give out with the
feedback. I am feeling the dude may be spot on, etc. But I will
guess that you will not see it this way. Which is good with me.
http://www.slideshare.net/mobile/UnitB166ER/theological-implications-of-the-simulation-argument-by-eric-steinhart
Even if we are living in one of a infinite number of recursive
simulations it doesn't necessarily imply that the guy who's
simulating us must be smarter than we are, and it would be a pretty
poor sort of God if we're smarter than He is. A simulated hurricane
is smarter at predicting what a real hurricane will do than the
meteorologist who created the simulation, and a simulated Chess
grandmaster is smarter at Chess than the real Chess grandmaster who
wrote the Chess program. And even if the simulation argument is
true (and the restriction on the number of calculations that can be
performed in the observable universe may rule out infinite levels,
unless that restriction was just tacked on by our simulators) you
wouldn't have all the knowledge that the infinite number of
simulations below you have. Steinhart also seems to assume that
every event have a cause, but I know of no law of logic that
demands that.
John K Clark
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