On 24 Mar 2015, at 04:39, LizR wrote:
Apologies
"Movie Graph Argument" - from Bruno's 2004 paper I believe.
Actually, MGA appears in step 8, but is not explained in the sane04
paper. I only referred to it.
The original publication is
Marchal, B., "informatique et théorie de l'esprit", Acte du Colloque
de l'ARC, Toulouse 1987. Proceeding 1988.
(It is the colloquium where I meet Dennett, but we discussed only on
Church thesis, where we agreed, I did not explain the MGA orally,
because we got only 20 minutes, and it is close to impossible to go
that quick. Orally I explained only the basic of self-reproduction and
self-reference, the Dx = xx song).
I also don't know whether it makes more or less sense for a
recording to be conscious than a computation.
It is the assumption of computationalism, that consciousness is
relatively instantiated by computation, that is, some activity done by
some universal numbers relatively to some universal numbers.
However I have a feeling Bruno addressed this when he was explaining
the who thing to me, some time ago - it doesn't matter whether the
recording is conscious or not, it's just one of the infinite number
of possible computations that contribute to generating that moment
of consciousness.
Hmm, not really. But a recording can change a measure, because it
contains the instantaneous description which can be used to re-
instantiate a computer, and then differentiate. But it is absurd to
attribute the consciousness here-and-now to a movie, which
instantiates zero computation. In films we see only "zombie", as you
can realize if you try to discuss with James Bond, through a movie, or
if you try the Turing test with "him", through the movie. What makes a
computation different from a movie, is that it is counterfactually
correct. Now, what the MGA shows, is that consciousness is related to
that counterfactualness, which is part of the mathematical
realization, (and physical, sometimes, relatively to you).
Consciousness is a semantical notion, and it makes sense through the
correctness of the conunterfactuals, which are part of some
arithmetical proposition being true. The recording has no similar rich
semantics, as it is only a remind of the existence of that
computation. The difficulties in materialism really comes from the
useless reification of a token reality, once you think consciousness
is invariant for relative digital substitution.
Perhaps! Altho it seems to me that is assuming comp so maybe I
didn't get that right.
You were right, but usually the attribution of consciousness to a
recording is where I stop the reductio ad absurdum, as there is no
computation in a recording, and like Maudlin showed this would entail
also magical abilities of neuron to detect inactive neurons, or even
non interacting objects, and this locally (in a supposedly Turing
emulable way). To me the idea that a record is conscious is as absurd
that the belief a glass is broken in a cartoon by Donald when he sent
a ball on the glass.
There is no problem attributing consciousness to the recording,
though, if you keep in mind that recording cannot differentiate in
the universal dovetailing, unlike computation. They might
differentiate by some accidental circumstances, as described above,
but then they are again part of a computation, and only played the
role of some memory.
The differentiation are due to inputs (like W or M), and recordings
have no inputs, unless your call them "temproary memory" waiting to be
installed by in some computers.
In fact the measure "here" is somehow given by the future
duplications, which I sum up by the little drawing Y = II. Y
represents the time diagram of the bifurcation, and the bifurcation go
back in the path augmenting the measure of that set of computations.
To multiply yourself is a good life insurance. But if you are OK that
2+2=4 is true independently of your little ego, then that
multiplication becomes infinite and is already realized in all
possible ways in a tiny part of arithmetic. And explaining matter
becomes more difficult, but more interesting too, and the way I
proceed give communicable and non communicable, which is a good
candidate for a precise theory of qualia (as qX1* is supposed to be,
accepting some old antic definitions in epistemology).
Bruno
On 24 March 2015 at 16:17, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>
wrote:
Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Mar 24, 2015 at 10:10:37AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Mar 24, 2015 at 11:48:52AM +1300, LizR wrote:
On 23 March 2015 at 16:09, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
That's where the MGA comes in. It purports to show that one of the
possible substrates is inert matter, which seems so absurd that we
should
conclude the matter plays no part whatsoever.
That sounds like Maudlin's Olimpia argument....?
So far I get that different substrates can create the same
computational
states (by which I assume we mean the contents of registers and
memory?)
But how does the MGA get from showing that to showing that inert
matter can
be a possible substrate? (ISTM that a projected graph is not inert, if
that's the argument.)
Broadly, the idea is to use notion that movement is relative. If a
machine is moving through a fixed sequence of states, we can
equivalently set things up so the machine is inert, but the observer
moves in such a way that appearance is unchanged. The absurdity is
that this implies consciousness depends on the motion of the observer.
No, it doesn't imply any such thing. The motion of the observer, or
rate of change of the sequence of states, is irrelevant to
consciousness. The only relevant thing is the states themselves --
the rate at which they are observed (or even if they are static)
does not matter.
Then clearly, you have no problem with the concept of a conscious
recording.
In order for the MGA to go through, conscious recordings need to be
considered absurd.
I personally, don't have an opinion either way, which is why I
consider that to be a rather serious flaw of the MGA.
If you take the block universe model seriously then we are nothing
more than conscious recordings!
I don't know what MGA stands for, or what it means, so I can't
comment on that.
Bruce
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