On 26 Mar 2015, at 07:38, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Mar 2015, at 06:31, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 3/23/2015 10:05 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
In fact, I can write computer programs where the laws of physics
change from instant to instant. Why do we not experience these
things?
Aye, there's the rub. Bruno claims that such capricious
sequences of experience must have small measure. But I think the
"must" means "so that my theory will hold water." Anyway he
admits it's an open problem to show that the UD doesn't just
produce experiential confetti.
So why do we waste time on such an incomplete theory?
I would say that rather than such random sequences of experiences
having small measure, they must dominate.
OK. So the winning program in the FPI limit of what happen below
the subst level, "we" learn to manage that noise. Why not? That
fits with Feynmann formulation of QM. We would have, to sum up
terrribly:
In the work of the UD, the winner (the one generating the stable
illusion) is SUM on all e^iUD.
The trouble I see with this is that it already assumes the linear
superposition principle and quantum mechanics
Not literaly, but I see what you means. That is why I define the
observable by the "measure one" on the sigma_1 sentence, to "obeys"
the constraints of computationalism has illustrated in the UDA.
. But that has not been derived in your theory and it is
illegitimate to use it at this point.
I did not do that. I refer you to my publications for the details of
what has been done.
It has an advantage on current physics, it splits the truth between
the truth on computers, and what computers can know, observe, feel
about it.
The Feynman sum-over-paths works only because we have deterministic
physical laws that enable us to compute the phases along alternative
paths. You do not have such laws in evidence.
Well. The UDA shows that there is not much choice in the matter if you
want to stay objective of the relation between subjective and
objective. And then, the "measure one", an abtsract prerequiste is
offered by the introspective universal machine in the form of by three
theories, called S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*.
I think somehow that is correct, and I show that there is already
the shadow of something like that being justify by the reasoner
reasoning on itself and its consistent extensions.
I doubt that that makes any sense for a new-born baby who,
nevertheless, experiences an ordered world.
?
Indeed, you need already a good maturity in math, and a taste for
philosophy of mind. Some pretend the fear of death appear at the age
of four, and normally, that should be technically enough to explain
this to a 4 years old child. But that would be akin to bad treatment
(unless he asks for it).
All, what I say is understandable ny any u endowed with enough
induction power. my generic one is the "well known" PA (the
Escherichia Coli of the universal number having enough induction
power: the one I call the löbian numbers.
We need the glue of laws to hold our sequence of experiences
together
Our dreams, yes. I suggest to "dream" a sequence of experience.
particular case are given by the awake state relative to some
computation(s).
-- and these laws can only come from experience.
They can be inferred from experience. But they might be justifiable
by a deeper (theological) theory, which would explain the origin
and necessity of the physical laws.
So you need to do the work to achieve this justification within your
model. At the moment, you just seem to assume those parts of
physical theory that you want.
You might be a bit unfair. I assume only RA, and I use only standard
definition in philosophy.
UDA explains why physics is reduced to a calculus of uncertainty on
computations "seen from inside", and the math part (which took 300
years of development, I only made it easy) describe what machine can
say, from inside, with "the inside" defined by the necessary nuances
brought by incompleteness for what universal numbers/machines can
expect about themselves.
I am not sure you got the tilt of the UDA, or are aware that a tiny
fragment of arithmetic realize already all computations, and that all
u are uncertain about which u they are and which other u supports them.
I do not assume a physical universe, even at the start of the UDA,
althrough it is simpler to think and do so, but I do assulme the
stability of some u (brain, doctors, ...). If you see a flaw, please
tell me at which step. It is mainly a formulation of a problem, + an
embryo of solution, when the problem is asked to the universal löbian
machine. The löbian number are those who are universal number and who
know that there are universal numbers (at least).
Frankly, you just showed that you have not really take a look on what
I have done. I know the long text are in french, but sane04 is a good
summary.
My main interest is in the origin of physical laws. Like Wheeler I
don't think that it is a physical process, but more like the sharable
observable invariant (measure one) of the universal Turing number in
arithmetic, or in any first person specification of any universal
number.
You might need good book in theoretical computer science and
mathematical logic, if you doubt of the use I make of the notion.
It helps to be aware of the mind-body problem, the main motivation,
which can be divided, when assuming computationalism, into two hard
problems: the consciousness problem, the matter problem. I show only
that they are partially translatable in arithmetic, and that some
universal numbers share a stable opinion on that.
It would be a lie to claim that science has decided between Aristotle
(reality is what you see, measure), and Plato (what you see, measure,
are the shadow of something else). My work suggests, in some precise
way, that computationalism sides with Plato on the mind body issue,
indeed even on Pythagorus, which is somehow rehabilitate through
Church-Turing thesis.
Bruno
Bruce
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
