On 3/23/2015 5:44 PM, LizR wrote:
On 24 March 2015 at 13:07, meekerdb <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
wrote:
Yes, as I understand it that's the argument. It's consistent with
Platonism. A
computer program's execution written out on paper is just as much a
calculation as a
lot of transistors switching.
So is the idea to show that a recording is just as conscious as the original
calculation?
My caveat is that neither of them is conscious in THIS world because being
conscious
requires being conscious OF something. An isolated, pure consciousness is
an
oxymoron. Consciousness only exists as part of thoughts and thoughts only
have
meaning by reference to an external world and potential action in that
world.
I am under the impression Bruno gets around that by potentially allowing the environment
to be simulated as well. Or contrariwise, can't all the inputs to the conscisouness be
provided as though it was in the world? (as for a brain in a vat for example. I mean
hypothetically, and to simplify the argument, not as a general model of consciousness.)
Yes, he casually dismisses the objection by saying we'll just include the environment
too. But that's my point that it's then no longer a new radical result. It's just saying
that if you simulate a world it can include conscious beings who are conscious of that
world. But IN THAT WORLD their substrate is not inert - even if it's inert in our world,
e.g. consider the novel "Mody Dick" being simulated in a computer. To Ishmael and Ahab in
the computer they'd be conscious and experiencing the hunt for the white whale. And,
according to Platonists, they are as printed on the page too.
Brent
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