On 18 Nov 2014, at 19:13, meekerdb wrote:
Physics has become so abstract and mathematical that it tempts
philosophers to conclude that mathematics is all there is. An
interesting question is whether a complete mathematical description
constitutes the thing described? If you had a complete, precise
description of a world and how it works, would it add anything to
also say, "It exists"?
What do you mean by complete description? There is already no complete
description of the arithmetical reality.
I think your question depends on what you assume to exist at the
conceptual base.
It is easier to define the physical reality by the universal machine/
number observable, than to define the universal machine by its
implementations in a physical reality.
I don't believe in the God Matter.
I don't disbelieve in it either. I am agnostic.
It is up to the materialist to explain how matter succeeds in making
some universal machine feeling themselves more real than their cousins
in arithmetic, notably those living in the diophantine emulation of
the rational approximation of the quantum vacuums (say).
Primitive matter is to computationalism what Bohmian hidden variable
are to Everett. Adding complication to avoid a larger ontology or
larger epistemology.
Ah! Universal numbers get that tendency to want to be the only one
loved by God, to be Unique! But then come the Little Sister, and well,
the hard and long path toward the secret understanding of God
Unconditional Love. Oops!
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
