On 3/27/2015 10:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 18 Nov 2014, at 19:13, meekerdb wrote:
Physics has become so abstract and mathematical that it tempts philosophers to conclude
that mathematics is all there is. An interesting question is whether a complete
mathematical description constitutes the thing described? If you had a complete,
precise description of a world and how it works, would it add anything to also say, "It
exists"?
What do you mean by complete description? There is already no complete description of
the arithmetical reality.
The is no complete proof within PA of all theorems. I don't think that's the same thing
as no complete description in mathematics - there's no reason to be confined to proofs in
PA. Nor is it necessarily assumed that the world is infinite.
Brent
I think your question depends on what you assume to exist at the conceptual
base.
It is easier to define the physical reality by the universal machine/number observable,
than to define the universal machine by its implementations in a physical reality.
I don't believe in the God Matter.
I don't disbelieve in it either. I am agnostic.
It is up to the materialist to explain how matter succeeds in making some universal
machine feeling themselves more real than their cousins in arithmetic, notably those
living in the diophantine emulation of the rational approximation of the quantum vacuums
(say).
Primitive matter is to computationalism what Bohmian hidden variable are to Everett.
Adding complication to avoid a larger ontology or larger epistemology.
Ah! Universal numbers get that tendency to want to be the only one loved by God, to be
Unique! But then come the Little Sister, and well, the hard and long path toward the
secret understanding of God Unconditional Love. Oops!
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
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