On 28 Mar 2015, at 00:50, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/27/2015 3:21 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le 27 mars 2015 23:09, "meekerdb" <[email protected]> a écrit :
>
> On 3/27/2015 4:06 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> 2015-03-27 11:44 GMT+01:00 LizR <[email protected]>:
>>>
>>> On 27 March 2015 at 23:24, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]>
wrote:
>>>>
>>>> 2015-03-27 10:12 GMT+01:00 LizR <[email protected]>:
>>>>>
>>>>> On 27 March 2015 at 19:28, Quentin Anciaux
<[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The ab asurdo is showing computationalism is incompatible
with physical supervenience, not that it is true.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes sorry, "reject" was a poor choice of words. I meant argue
from the comp position rather than the materialist one, and know
what I'm talking about.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In the end by being forced to accept consciousness must
supervene on the movie + broken gate... If you believe it,
then you've abandon computationalism as a theory of the mind as the
movie+broken gates is not a computation... Or you can keep
computationalism and abandon physical supervenience.... QED
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes I realise that. The same applies to Maudlin. All I wanted
to know at the moment was how the contradiction arises in the MGA.
>>>>>
>>>> It seems to me that's what I explained...
>>>
>>>
>>> I'm sure it does. As I said, I can't quite get my head around
it, so it's unlikely a quick overview is going to help me do
so. (After all I couldn't follow Bruno's explanation, which
involved smoke and mirrors, or something similar.) Maybe I'm just
the wrong type of geek to be able to grok this argument, but I keep
trying.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> it arises because under computationalism, it is assumed
consciousness is supported by a computation.... under
computationlism + physical supervenience, it assumed the
computation is eventually supported by physcial activity and
eventually this leads to attribute consciousness to the record,
which is not a computation, contradicting the assumption of
computationalism...
>>>>
>>> Yes, I can see that if you are led to attribute consciousness
to a record then that will contradict the original assumption. But
I haven't yet been able to see how the MGA leads to attributing
consciousness to a record. I'm sure it does show that, but for me
it doesn't quite click. Maybe I'm doomed to never get an intuitive
grasp of the argument.
>
>
>>
>> 1- It is assumed you have a machinery/program that is conscious.
(a real conscious AI)
>> 2- You have (for example) a conversation with it.
>> 3- While doing that conversation, you record all inputs fed to
the machine.
>> 4- You replay those inputs to the machine.
>> 5- Assuming in 3 the machine was conscious, replaying the same
inputs, the machine should still be conscious.
>> 6- You remove from the machine all the transistor not in use
during that particular run (given the recorded input)
>> 7- You replay those inputs to the ("crippled") machine.
>> 8- Assuming in 3 and 5 the machine was conscious, replaying the
same inputs, the machine should still be conscious as in 5 (because
what you removed wasn't in use anyway).
>> 9- You break one transistor, but you make a device (in the MGA
it's the projection of the record on the graph) that permits (even
if the transistor is broke) to mimic the output at the exact moment
it should have happen if the transistor wasn't broken (like the
lucky cosmic ray replacing the firing of a neuron).
>> 10- Assuming in 3,5 and 8 the machine was conscious, replaying
the same inputs, the machine should still be conscious as the
broken transistor while not working did nonetheless gave the
correct output thanks to the lucky ray/devide/movie projection.
>> 11- You do 9 for all the transistor, so as to leave only the
mimic...
>> 12- Assuming in 3,5,8 and 10 the machine was conscious, then the
machine is still conscious while no computation occur anymore....
contradicting computationalism.
>>
>> From that, either computationalism is false or physical
supervenience is false.
>
>
>
> A good outline, but it doesn't address the question of
counterfactual correctness. After step 6 the machine can no longer
respond correctly to a different input - it and whatever
computation it does, is no longer counterfactually correct.
Assuming non active parts are needed (negating the move of step 6)
basically means physical supervenience is false.
?? Of course the non-active parts are needed for different inputs -
otherwise they're not needed for anything and need not be part of
the AI.
> Of course you can expand the AI to include so much of the world
that there are effectively no inputs; which is the same as saying
it computes the outputs for all possible inputs. But then it has
become a Matrix type world unto itself.
Here you're talking about the level at which the emulation
occurs... Or, the conclusion is valid for any finite level,
whatever it is.
My point is that if the level has to be very large, e.g. the whole
universe, then no reversal has been achieved; the MGA is only saying
a simulated world is possible, one in which consciousness and
physics are instantiated together - as we supposed they are in this
world.
Except that you have to justify "this world" from the infinitely many
one emulated in arithmetic. The reversal is still achieved. That world
and its program might be unique, but that is part of what must be
justified, or you come back with some magical world/god doing the
selection. If that world is unique, we know already that it has to be
a multiverse, to win the FPI on arithmetic.
Bruno
Brent
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