2015-03-27 11:44 GMT+01:00 LizR <[email protected]>:
> On 27 March 2015 at 23:24, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>> 2015-03-27 10:12 GMT+01:00 LizR <[email protected]>:
>>
>>> On 27 March 2015 at 19:28, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>
>>>> The ab asurdo is showing computationalism is incompatible with physical
>>>> supervenience, not that it is true.
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes sorry, "reject" was a poor choice of words. I meant argue from the
>>> comp position rather than the materialist one, and know what I'm talking
>>> about.
>>>
>>>
>>>> In the end by being forced to accept consciousness must supervene on
>>>> the movie + broken gate... If you believe it, then you've abandon
>>>> computationalism as a theory of the mind as the movie+broken gates is not a
>>>> computation... Or you can keep computationalism and abandon physical
>>>> supervenience.... QED
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes I realise that. The same applies to Maudlin. All I wanted to know at
>>> the moment was how the contradiction arises in the MGA.
>>>
>>> It seems to me that's what I explained...
>>
>
> I'm sure it does. As I said, I can't quite get my head around it, so it's
> unlikely a quick overview is going to help me do so. (After all I couldn't
> follow Bruno's explanation, which involved smoke and mirrors, or something
> similar.) Maybe I'm just the wrong type of geek to be able to grok this
> argument, but I keep trying.
>
>
>> it arises because under computationalism, it is assumed consciousness is
>> supported by a computation.... under computationlism + physical
>> supervenience, it assumed the computation is eventually supported by
>> physcial activity and eventually this leads to attribute consciousness to
>> the record, which is not a computation, contradicting the assumption of
>> computationalism...
>>
>> Yes, I can see that if you are led to attribute consciousness to a record
> then that will contradict the original assumption. But I haven't yet been
> able to see how the MGA leads to attributing consciousness to a record. I'm
> sure it does show that, but for me it doesn't quite click. Maybe I'm doomed
> to never get an intuitive grasp of the argument.
>
1- It is assumed you have a machinery/program that is conscious. (a real
conscious AI)
2- You have (for example) a conversation with it.
3- While doing that conversation, you record all inputs fed to the machine.
4- You replay those inputs to the machine.
5- Assuming in 3 the machine was conscious, replaying the same inputs, the
machine should still be conscious.
6- You remove from the machine all the transistor not in use during that
particular run (given the recorded input)
7- You replay those inputs to the ("crippled") machine.
8- Assuming in 3 and 5 the machine was conscious, replaying the same
inputs, the machine should still be conscious as in 5 (because what you
removed wasn't in use anyway).
9- You break one transistor, but you make a device (in the MGA it's the
projection of the record on the graph) that permits (even if the transistor
is broke) to mimic the output at the exact moment it should have happen if
the transistor wasn't broken (like the lucky cosmic ray replacing the
firing of a neuron).
10- Assuming in 3,5 and 8 the machine was conscious, replaying the same
inputs, the machine should still be conscious as the broken transistor
while not working did nonetheless gave the correct output thanks to the
lucky ray/devide/movie projection.
11- You do 9 for all the transistor, so as to leave only the mimic...
12- Assuming in 3,5,8 and 10 the machine was conscious, then the machine is
still conscious while no computation occur anymore.... contradicting
computationalism.
>From that, either computationalism is false or physical supervenience is
false.
Regards,
Quentin
>
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