Bruno: is an* EMPTY SET *indeed nothingness? Does it not include the "* S E T "* recognizing that it is EMPTY? nothingness may be the CONTENT of the empty set. Just as a singularity, which has borders to end, measures, characteristics etc.? Nothingness as empty set should be infinite and include the entire Everything. I consider the term *NOTHINGNESS* just as unfathonable, as infinite, or 'ever'.
JM On Sat, Mar 28, 2015 at 12:48 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 28 Mar 2015, at 10:22, Mindey I. wrote: > > Hi Everyone, > > so, my background: http://mindey.com/42 -- I always wanted to know its > origin precisely. > > The understanding of the origin of Universe(=Everything, Multiverse, > and our Life experience included) was likely never fully successful. > Fundamental obstacle for succeeding in it has been the logical > inconsistency of the concepts "Origin" and "Universe", because an > attempt to explain Everything by Something, makes the Something part > of Everything, which leaves us with "Nothingness", as the only viable > candidate for "Origin". > > > Hmm, you will need to explain the origin of "nothingness". > > And the problem I see here is that you have as much notion of nothingness > that you have notion of things. > > > > > Universe to us subjectively appears as a complex and diverse > experience. In fact, except for some regularity (which we call laws of > physics), the patterns we see every day appear so complex, that only > something like a universal computer with large memory could possibly > generate it. We had recently even done so by creating 3D computer > games and worlds running on Universal Turing Machines (UTMs) -- our > computers. > > From here, we can conclude: > > (1) It follows that, _if_ we could come up with a UTM from > "Nothingness", we could explain pretty much everything that is > computable. > > > If you take the set notion of "nothingness", that is the empty set, then > from just the notion of unary intersection of set gives the everything > notion of sets. That contains all computable things, and also all non > computable things. But it might be too much. > > > > > > Our experiences rely on finite numbers of receptors with limited > granularity (selectivity), and limited lifespan, which seem to imply > finite number of possible experiences (as their Cartesian product) by > a being. > > > This might be equivalent with the computationalist assumption. > > > > (2) It follows that, our life experience is likely computable. > > > > Hmm... Not really, because with everything/nothing type of theories, if we > are finite objects, we are distributed in infinitely may examplary in the > everything, and this introduce a non computable element in our life > experiment. > You might read: > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html > > > > > > > To come up with a UTM from "Nothingness", let's: > > 1. assume "Nothingness" > > > Unfortunately this is too much fuzzy. > > > 2. conclude "Equidistance" > (because "Nothingness" means equal absence of information regarding > any aspect whatsoever) > > > Assuming some metrical space. > > > > 3. see the definition of a ball > 4. see the computation of Pi number with varying precision, i.e.: > > Remember balls from degenerate ones in low-dimensional spaces with > special coordinate systems and weird distance metrics, to quite > standard Euclidean ones, to hypersphere, to the most near-perfect > conceivable ball regading any information aspect whatsoever. > > > The idea is nice and would have pleased Plotinus, but I am not sure if you > are aware of the many assumption you make here. > > At least I guess you agree that some part of mathematics has to be assumed. > > > > Unfortunately, we don't know if Pi is really equivalent to UTM, > > > Pi is a particular computable number. I don't see how you can make it > equivalent with a computing machine, which can be seen as the given a > finite number verifying some number relation. > > > > because we had not yet solved the Normality of Pi conjecture, > > > > You can take the number 0,12345678910111213141516171819202122... instead. > (Champernow number). > > But again, using some coding (well, decoding) you can see all description > of all computations of all Turing machine. But you will not see any > computation, which are more abstract relation. It is a common confusion, > but description of relation are not the same as the relation themselves. > > > > but > assuming it is Normal, to understand how your unique experience of > life could have arisen: > > 1. assume that your life experience is a finite number > 2. conclude that it is in Pi. > > > So I disagree. Your experiences are in the number of champernow, but they > are not in the relation making them into computations. It is like confusing > Borges babel library and the universal dovetailling. > > The universal dovetailing (generation and running of all programs) > existence can be proved in very little theory, but you need more than > syntactucal information: you need the relevant computable relations. > > > > > However, if Pi is normal, then then the conclusion is not informative > at all, because we will find any finite string in it many times over. > > It would be much more informative, if Pi actually is _not_ normal. > > Any comments/errors? > > > You need to be clear on the things you assume, and the minimal laws they > obey. > > In this list (and in my publication) I show that all specification of a > UTM can be used for deriving the physical laws and consciousness. I use a > very tiny fragment of arithmetic, or even a smaller theory (SK-combinators)/ > > I think your main confusion is between a description of a computation, and > a computation. Amazibgly enough, I was just explaining that confusion, > which was cropping again in some critics of the step 8 of the main argument > in the paper linked above. > > Nice try, and quite in the spirit of this list, like Borges, and Everett, > but you might need to study what has already been done. Mathematical logic > can be useful to see what needs to be assume or not, and to make clear the > presentation of the theory. > > Also, you don't seem aware of the mind-body problem, which, when we assume > computationalism, reduces *any* theory of matter into a probability or > uncertainty calculus on computations. This has to be taken into account, or > you risk to eliminate persons and consciousness. In fact computationalism > is epistemologically incompatible with materialism (even the weak doctrine > which just assume some primitive physical reality). > > Bruno > > > > > Mindey > > Related: discussion on Halfbakery: > http://www.halfbakery.com/idea/Explanation_20of_20Origin_20of_20Universe > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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