RE: Something from nothing -- my attempt of derivation of a UTM.

Sun, 29 Mar 2015 16:17:39 -0700 

 

 

From: [email protected] 
[mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of John Mikes

 

Bruno,

not in my views!

Why would you deem an empty box "NOTHINGNESS"?

("when all the cigarettes have been smoked")

 

If we "talk" about nothingness, we render it a "somethingness". 

Your 'set' INCLUDES - CONTAINS nothing, not the set itself

turns into it.. Once you can say ANYTHING about the "SET" 

it is not nothing.

 

I need to go further to identify what I cannot identify.

 

I agree on this. 

The set itself is something; even if it is a meta something. Nothing is 
undefinable; the container of nothing is itself a container and therefore nor 
nothing; a perspective on nothing (in order to have a point of view) is itself 
not nothing; perceiving nothing is an act, which requires an actor… something 
doing the action.

Nothing does not exist, and nothing can be said about non-existence without 
giving it some form of existence… even the barest essential requirement of a 
point of view – the “dreamer” doing the “dreaming” entangles the story with all 
of emergence – a multiverse bowl of spaghetti code perhaps (A Cobol multiverse).

Nothing, of course is a very convenient place holder that is commonly used to 
denote an empty set, but trying to define it is self-defeating; it is 
undefinable.

Chris

 

JM

 

On Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 3:46 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:

Hi John,

 

On 28 Mar 2015, at 22:32, John Mikes wrote:





Bruno:

 

is an EMPTY SET indeed nothingness? Does it not include the  " S E T "  
recognizing that it is EMPTY? nothingness may be the CONTENT of the empty set. 

 

The empty set is the set without element. You can denote it by { }.

 

It has some typical property; notably that:  A union { } = A, A intersection { 
} = { }.

 

The unary intersection of a set is given by the intersection of the element of 
a set (of sets):

 

Unary intersection { { a b c} {a t r }} = {a}

 

The unary intersection of { } = the set universe (the collection of all set). I 
can explain someday. It is like the empty conjunction is always true (someone 
who say nothing can't be refuted).

 

 

 





Just as a singularity, which has borders to end, measures, characteristics 
etc.? 

Nothingness as empty set should be infinite 

 

Then it has infinitely many elements, and is hardly empty. The empty set is 
like a box of cigarettes, when all the cigarettes have been smoked.

 

 





and include the entire Everything. 

 

Through the unary intersection, this intuition is made precise.

 





I consider the term NOTHINGNESS just as unfathonable, as infinite, or 'ever'. 

 

I agree, because it is a theory dependent notion. If you change the theory of 
sets (and there are many) you change the notion of nothingness and 
everythingness. The important thing to agree on is the notion of thing, or of 
what we agree to assume the existence, so that we can talk about something.

 

Bruno

 

 





 

JM

 

On Sat, Mar 28, 2015 at 12:48 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:

 

On 28 Mar 2015, at 10:22, Mindey I. wrote:





Hi Everyone,

so, my background: http://mindey.com/42 -- I always wanted to know its
origin precisely.

The understanding of the origin of Universe(=Everything, Multiverse,
and our Life experience included) was likely never fully successful.
Fundamental obstacle for succeeding in it has been the logical
inconsistency of the concepts "Origin" and "Universe", because an
attempt to explain Everything by Something, makes the Something part
of Everything, which leaves us with "Nothingness", as the only viable
candidate for "Origin".

 

Hmm, you will need to explain the origin of "nothingness".

 

And the problem I see here is that you have as much notion of nothingness that 
you have notion of things.

 

 






Universe to us subjectively appears as a complex and diverse
experience. In fact, except for some regularity (which we call laws of
physics), the patterns we see every day appear so complex, that only
something like a universal computer with large memory could possibly
generate it. We had recently even done so by creating 3D computer
games and worlds running on Universal Turing Machines (UTMs) -- our
computers.

>From here, we can conclude:

 (1) It follows that, _if_ we could come up with a UTM from
"Nothingness", we could explain pretty much everything that is
computable.

 

If you take the set notion of "nothingness", that is the empty set, then from 
just the notion of unary intersection of set gives the everything notion of 
sets. That contains all computable things, and also all non computable things. 
But it might be too much. 

 

 

 






Our experiences rely on finite numbers of receptors with limited
granularity (selectivity), and limited lifespan, which seem to imply
finite number of possible experiences (as their Cartesian product) by
a being.

 

This might be equivalent with the computationalist assumption. 

 






 (2) It follows that, our life experience is likely computable.

 

 

Hmm... Not really, because with everything/nothing type of theories, if we are 
finite objects, we are distributed in infinitely may examplary in the 
everything, and this introduce a non computable element in our life experiment.

You might read:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 

 

 

 






To come up with a UTM from "Nothingness", let's:

1. assume "Nothingness"

 

Unfortunately this is too much fuzzy.

 





2. conclude "Equidistance"
(because "Nothingness" means equal absence of information regarding
any aspect whatsoever)

 

Assuming some metrical space.

 

 





3. see the definition of a ball
4. see the computation of Pi number with varying precision, i.e.:

Remember balls from degenerate ones in low-dimensional spaces with
special coordinate systems and weird distance metrics, to quite
standard Euclidean ones, to hypersphere, to the most near-perfect
conceivable ball regading any information aspect whatsoever.

 

The idea is nice and would have pleased Plotinus, but I am not sure if you are 
aware of the many assumption you make here.

 

At least I guess you agree that some part of mathematics has to be assumed.

 






Unfortunately, we don't know if Pi is really equivalent to UTM,

 

Pi is a particular computable number. I don't see how you can make it 
equivalent with a computing machine, which can be seen as the given a finite 
number verifying some number relation.

 

 





because we had not yet solved the Normality of Pi conjecture,

 

 

You can take the number 0,12345678910111213141516171819202122... instead. 
(Champernow number).

 

But again, using some coding (well, decoding) you can see all description of 
all computations of all Turing machine. But you will not see any computation, 
which are more abstract relation. It is a common confusion, but description of 
relation are not the same as the relation themselves.

 

 





but
assuming it is Normal, to understand how your unique experience of
life could have arisen:

1. assume that your life experience is a finite number
2. conclude that it is in Pi.

 

So I disagree. Your experiences are in the number of champernow, but they are 
not in the relation making them into computations. It is like confusing Borges 
babel library and the universal dovetailling.

 

The universal dovetailing (generation and running of all programs) existence 
can be proved in very little theory, but you need more than syntactucal 
information: you need the relevant computable relations.

 

 






However, if Pi is normal, then then the conclusion is not informative
at all, because we will find any finite string in it many times over.

It would be much more informative, if Pi actually is _not_ normal.

Any comments/errors?

 

You need to be clear on the things you assume, and the minimal laws they obey. 

 

In this list (and in my publication) I show that all specification of a UTM can 
be used for deriving the physical laws and consciousness. I use a very tiny 
fragment of arithmetic, or even a smaller theory (SK-combinators)/

 

I think your main confusion is between a description of a computation, and a 
computation. Amazibgly enough, I was just explaining that confusion, which was 
cropping again in some critics of the step 8 of the main argument in the paper 
linked above.

 

Nice try, and quite in the spirit of this list, like Borges, and Everett, but 
you might need to study what has already been done. Mathematical logic can be 
useful to see what needs to be assume or not, and to make clear the 
presentation of the theory.

 

Also, you don't seem aware of the mind-body problem, which, when we assume 
computationalism, reduces *any*  theory of matter into a probability or 
uncertainty calculus on computations. This has to be taken into account, or you 
risk to eliminate persons and consciousness. In fact computationalism is 
epistemologically incompatible with materialism (even the weak doctrine which 
just assume some primitive physical reality).

 

Bruno

 

 



Mindey

Related: discussion on Halfbakery:
http://www.halfbakery.com/idea/Explanation_20of_20Origin_20of_20Universe

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected] 
<mailto:everything-list%[email protected]> .
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

 

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

 

 

 

 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

 

 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

 

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

 

 

 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to