Bruno,
not in my views!
Why would you deem an empty box "NOTHINGNESS"?
("when all the cigarettes have been smoked")If we "talk" about nothingness, we render it a "somethingness". Your 'set' INCLUDES - CONTAINS nothing, not the set itself turns into it.. Once you can say ANYTHING about the "SET" it is not nothing. I need to go further to identify what I cannot identify. JM On Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 3:46 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi John, > > On 28 Mar 2015, at 22:32, John Mikes wrote: > > Bruno: > > is an* EMPTY SET *indeed nothingness? Does it not include the "* S E T "* > recognizing that it is EMPTY? nothingness may be the CONTENT of the empty > set. > > > The empty set is the set without element. You can denote it by { }. > > It has some typical property; notably that: A union { } = A, A > intersection { } = { }. > > The unary intersection of a set is given by the intersection of the > element of a set (of sets): > > Unary intersection { { a b c} {a t r }} = {a} > > The unary intersection of { } = the set universe (the collection of all > set). I can explain someday. It is like the empty conjunction is always > true (someone who say nothing can't be refuted). > > > > > Just as a singularity, which has borders to end, measures, characteristics > etc.? > Nothingness as empty set should be infinite > > > Then it has infinitely many elements, and is hardly empty. The empty set > is like a box of cigarettes, when all the cigarettes have been smoked. > > > > and include the entire Everything. > > > Through the unary intersection, this intuition is made precise. > > > I consider the term *NOTHINGNESS* just as unfathonable, as infinite, or > 'ever'. > > > I agree, because it is a theory dependent notion. If you change the theory > of sets (and there are many) you change the notion of nothingness and > everythingness. The important thing to agree on is the notion of thing, or > of what we agree to assume the existence, so that we can talk about > something. > > Bruno > > > > > JM > > On Sat, Mar 28, 2015 at 12:48 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 28 Mar 2015, at 10:22, Mindey I. wrote: >> >> Hi Everyone, >> >> so, my background: http://mindey.com/42 -- I always wanted to know its >> origin precisely. >> >> The understanding of the origin of Universe(=Everything, Multiverse, >> and our Life experience included) was likely never fully successful. >> Fundamental obstacle for succeeding in it has been the logical >> inconsistency of the concepts "Origin" and "Universe", because an >> attempt to explain Everything by Something, makes the Something part >> of Everything, which leaves us with "Nothingness", as the only viable >> candidate for "Origin". >> >> >> Hmm, you will need to explain the origin of "nothingness". >> >> And the problem I see here is that you have as much notion of nothingness >> that you have notion of things. >> >> >> >> >> Universe to us subjectively appears as a complex and diverse >> experience. In fact, except for some regularity (which we call laws of >> physics), the patterns we see every day appear so complex, that only >> something like a universal computer with large memory could possibly >> generate it. We had recently even done so by creating 3D computer >> games and worlds running on Universal Turing Machines (UTMs) -- our >> computers. >> >> From here, we can conclude: >> >> (1) It follows that, _if_ we could come up with a UTM from >> "Nothingness", we could explain pretty much everything that is >> computable. >> >> >> If you take the set notion of "nothingness", that is the empty set, then >> from just the notion of unary intersection of set gives the everything >> notion of sets. That contains all computable things, and also all non >> computable things. But it might be too much. >> >> >> >> >> >> Our experiences rely on finite numbers of receptors with limited >> granularity (selectivity), and limited lifespan, which seem to imply >> finite number of possible experiences (as their Cartesian product) by >> a being. >> >> >> This might be equivalent with the computationalist assumption. >> >> >> >> (2) It follows that, our life experience is likely computable. >> >> >> >> Hmm... Not really, because with everything/nothing type of theories, if >> we are finite objects, we are distributed in infinitely may examplary in >> the everything, and this introduce a non computable element in our life >> experiment. >> You might read: >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html >> >> >> >> >> >> >> To come up with a UTM from "Nothingness", let's: >> >> 1. assume "Nothingness" >> >> >> Unfortunately this is too much fuzzy. >> >> >> 2. conclude "Equidistance" >> (because "Nothingness" means equal absence of information regarding >> any aspect whatsoever) >> >> >> Assuming some metrical space. >> >> >> >> 3. see the definition of a ball >> 4. see the computation of Pi number with varying precision, i.e.: >> >> Remember balls from degenerate ones in low-dimensional spaces with >> special coordinate systems and weird distance metrics, to quite >> standard Euclidean ones, to hypersphere, to the most near-perfect >> conceivable ball regading any information aspect whatsoever. >> >> >> The idea is nice and would have pleased Plotinus, but I am not sure if >> you are aware of the many assumption you make here. >> >> At least I guess you agree that some part of mathematics has to be >> assumed. >> >> >> >> Unfortunately, we don't know if Pi is really equivalent to UTM, >> >> >> Pi is a particular computable number. I don't see how you can make it >> equivalent with a computing machine, which can be seen as the given a >> finite number verifying some number relation. >> >> >> >> because we had not yet solved the Normality of Pi conjecture, >> >> >> >> You can take the number 0,12345678910111213141516171819202122... instead. >> (Champernow number). >> >> But again, using some coding (well, decoding) you can see all description >> of all computations of all Turing machine. But you will not see any >> computation, which are more abstract relation. It is a common confusion, >> but description of relation are not the same as the relation themselves. >> >> >> >> but >> assuming it is Normal, to understand how your unique experience of >> life could have arisen: >> >> 1. assume that your life experience is a finite number >> 2. conclude that it is in Pi. >> >> >> So I disagree. Your experiences are in the number of champernow, but they >> are not in the relation making them into computations. It is like confusing >> Borges babel library and the universal dovetailling. >> >> The universal dovetailing (generation and running of all programs) >> existence can be proved in very little theory, but you need more than >> syntactucal information: you need the relevant computable relations. >> >> >> >> >> However, if Pi is normal, then then the conclusion is not informative >> at all, because we will find any finite string in it many times over. >> >> It would be much more informative, if Pi actually is _not_ normal. >> >> Any comments/errors? >> >> >> You need to be clear on the things you assume, and the minimal laws they >> obey. >> >> In this list (and in my publication) I show that all specification of a >> UTM can be used for deriving the physical laws and consciousness. I use a >> very tiny fragment of arithmetic, or even a smaller theory (SK-combinators)/ >> >> I think your main confusion is between a description of a computation, >> and a computation. Amazibgly enough, I was just explaining that confusion, >> which was cropping again in some critics of the step 8 of the main argument >> in the paper linked above. >> >> Nice try, and quite in the spirit of this list, like Borges, and Everett, >> but you might need to study what has already been done. Mathematical logic >> can be useful to see what needs to be assume or not, and to make clear the >> presentation of the theory. >> >> Also, you don't seem aware of the mind-body problem, which, when we >> assume computationalism, reduces *any* theory of matter into a probability >> or uncertainty calculus on computations. This has to be taken into account, >> or you risk to eliminate persons and consciousness. In fact >> computationalism is epistemologically incompatible with materialism (even >> the weak doctrine which just assume some primitive physical reality). >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> Mindey >> >> Related: discussion on Halfbakery: >> http://www.halfbakery.com/idea/Explanation_20of_20Origin_20of_20Universe >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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